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INTRODUCTION

July 24, 1994, will mark the twentieth anniversary of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nixon.1 This important
case resulted not only in this country's first (and only) resignation
of a sitting President, but also provided a formal recognition by
the United States Supreme Court of Executive Privilege as a constitutionally based doctrine. 2 The Court's recognition of what amounts
to an absolute privilege where foreign affairs and national security
are concerned, has the potential of allowing the Executive Branch
to act with impunity. The Court's more limited recognition of a
presumption of privilege in Executive Branch communications on
all other matters, while providing President Nixon little comfort,
has the potential to afford another President with what amounts to
control over his own prosecution.
Twenty years is an appropriate length of time from which to
begin assessing the actual consequences of United States v. Nixon,
the potential problems, and the possible solutions emanating from
the case. The following piece provides such an analysis by placing
United States v. Nixon in context. This is accomplished through an
examination of the early roots of Executive Privilege, as well as the
events surrounding the Nixon case. To assess the impact of United
States v. Nixon upon the doctrine of Executive Privilege, pertinent
events in the subsequent administrations are discussed. These include
the draft registration prosecution under Ronald Reagan and the
Iran-Contra investigation and prosecutions under George Bush.
Finally, this comment concludes with suggestions of what can be
1. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

Even after this length of time, yet another case concerning the Nixon tapes
and papers was handed down in October of 1992. Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d
1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court found that the continued holding by the United
States Government of Richard Nixon's official papers and tapes under the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988), amounted to a
government taking. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1284-87. Richard Nixon was found to be
entitled to compensation for these materials. Id.at 1287. While at this writing no
appeal to the Supreme Court has been accepted, it seems quite likely that one will
occur. The continued litigation over the ownership and secrecy of these materials
only serves to underscore their importance in the fabric of not only our political
history but our jurisprudential doctrine as well.
2. JOHN M. ORMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND DECEPTION: BEYOND THE

POWER TO PERSUADE 46 (1980). While the doctrine of Executive Privilege is used
most commonly in the context of Executive Branch and Legislative Branch relations
this comment will focus primarily upon the Executive Branch and Judicial Branch
context.
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done to assure the Executive Branch enough secrecy to effectively
discharge the office while maintaining a level of accountability and
attempting to blunt some of the dangerous potential that exists
under the current permutation of Executive Privilege.
While comment on United States v. Nixon and Executive Privilege may at first blush appear overly ambitious and esoteric, the
topic is timely and discussion is needed since the doctrine's use
appears to be on the rise. A void exists in thecurrent writings on
the subject. There has been little, if any, effort to assemble an
overview of what status Executive Privilege currently enjoys. While
much was written about United States v. Nixon at the time of the
decision, those works did not contextualize the case and integrate it
into the greater fabric of the doctrine's history. There are many
fine works on the theory of the doctrine and even some dealing
with the historical bits and pieces, but there is nothing which
integrates the high points into a summary of the subject. What
follows is in no way an exhaustive study of the subject, it is rather
an overview and analysis designed to help begin filling the void.

I.

HISTORY

3
The term "Executive Privilege" is of recent creation. The
concept embraces the notion that the separation of powers and an
inherent right to secrecy allows the Executive Branch to withhold
4
certain information from Congress and the Judiciary. Executive
Privilege is defined as:

Exempt[ing] the Executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such
exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important
Executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and
diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an
appropriate exercise of the executive's domestic decisional
and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental
advisory and deliberative communications.'
3. The term Executive Privilege appears to have sprung from and was used in
Justice Reed's opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co. v. United States, 157 F.
Supp. 939, 943 (Ct. CI. 1958). RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1 n.3 (1974).
4. ORMAN, supra note 2, at 41.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (6th ed. 1990).
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Nowhere in the text of the United States Constitution does the
term (and some would argue the concept) Executive Privilege appear. In contrast, the founding fathers did include a type of privilege
for Congress,6 the right to keep secret some of its proceedings.
Scholar Raoul Berger has observed that if the framers were specific
enough in Article I to provide Congress with the privilege to keep
secret certain information regarding their duties, the omission of a
companion provision under Article II would indicate that the President does not enjoy such a privilege.'
Former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox stated in
his article, Executive Privilege,' that there is little direct material
from the founders concerning Executive Privilege. He does point
out that James Wilson, one of the architects of the Constitution,
told the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention:
The Executive power is better to be trusted when it has no
screen. Sir, we have a responsibility in the person for our
President; he cannot act improperly, and hide either his
negligence or inattention; he cannot roll upon any other
person the weight of his criminality. . . . Add to all this,
that officer is placed high, and is possessed of power far
from being contemptible, yet not a single privilege is annexed
to his character. 9
The existence of some form of privilege under the founder's view
appears to be rooted in the existence of an early form of Executive
Privilege in the dawning years of the republic when many of the
founding fathers were active in the administration and adjudication
of issues involving early doctrinal forms.
A.

EARLY PRESIDENTIAL PRIVILEGE

The first exercise of what we view as Executive Privilege can
be found under President George Washington. 10 As with all the
early exercises of presidential privilege during the federalist period,
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see ORMAN, supra note 2, at 33.
7. BERGER, supra note 3, at 42.

8. Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
9. Id. at 1391 (quoting ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1836)).
10. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
4 (1981); ORMAN, supra note 2, at 33.
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information was withheld from Congress by the President." While
other episodes may be better known, the Gouverneur Morris Investigation may be the best example of the early approach to Executive
Privilege.1 2 Morris was the Ambassador to France from the United
States. The French, convinced that he was engaged in aiding and
supporting the aristocracy during their revolution, formally requested that he be withdrawn as ambassador. Congress then became
involved and began to investigate Morris' actions. As part of their
inquiry, they requested Morris' correspondence with the Executive
Branch. This correspondence included candid assessments of the
political situation in France, requests for diplomatic instructions,
personal observations, and what today might be termed intelligence
material. Attorney General William Bradford advised Washington
to withhold what he deemed appropriate, "as the Senate would not
expect that which might endanger national honour or individual
safety." 13 What Washington sent the Senate was censored and
marked confidential. The materials removed by the President related
to Morris' harsh expressions of opinion regarding the French leaders' behavior, the identities of French informants, and the information provided by those informants; it was the "intelligence"
portions of the correspondence. 14 The Senate was ultimately satisfied
and allowed the matter to dissipate in much the same way the
Congress even today, allows matters to burn themselves out.
By the 1790's, Congress had recognized some Executive right
to withhold certain sensitive information as evidenced by the Morris
affair. This was not the case with the Judiciary. Some commentators
have claimed that the first Executive Privilege case in a judicial
context was that of Marbury v. Madison. 5
Marbury v. Madison, at times, seems to be a case for all
seasons. Marbury, one of the most important Supreme Court opinions written by one of the Court's greatest Chief Justices, John
Marshall, was an outgrowth of the election of 1800. It was a product
11. The best known episodes from this period are the treaty with the Creek
Indian Nation in 1790, the Jay treaty with the British in 1795, and the disastrous
1792 St. Clair expedition inquiry. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 167-79; ORMAN, supra
note 2, at 33-35.
12. HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 104-18.
13. Id. at 109.
14. Id. at 111.
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). E.g., ADAM C. BRECKENRIDGE,
THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
HOFFMAN,

102-04 (1974). Contra

supra note 10, at 249.

BERGER,

supra note 3, at 185;
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of Thomas Jefferson's ascension to the Presidency.1 6 President John
Adams, in the final days of his administration, appointed a large
number of justices of the peace. 7 These appointments had been
confirmed by the Senate on Adams' last two days in office." The
law required that the appointments be sealed and delivered by the
Secretary of State. 19 Secretary of State John Marshall worked furiously through the night trying to complete the task before Adams'
term expired. He failed. James Madison, the new Secretary of State,
took office and refused to deliver the remaining appointments.
Marbury brought suit to obtain his appointment as Justice of the
Peace for the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court found that
due to the invalid designation of original jurisdiction to the Court
on a Writ of Mandamus, they did not have the power to hear the
suit. 20 In the process, the Court established its power of judicial
review over constitutional matters.
While most commentators focus upon the Court's holding
concerning judicial review, some have seized upon Attorney General
Levi Lincoln's assertion of privilege to find support for the modern
concept of Executive Privilege. 21
[He] is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain
officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with
his orders. In such cases their acts are his acts; and whatever
opinion may be entertained of the manner in which Executive
discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no
22
power to control that discretion.
16. Thomas Jefferson was in fact a cousin of John Marshall. To say Jefferson
disliked Marshall is a gross understatement. Early in his administration Jefferson
attempted to have Marshall impeached. HAROLD W. CHASE & CRAIG R.
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1974).

DUCAT,

17. Id. These and other judicial appointments including that of John Marshall
himself were the product of Adam's distrust of the Democratic-Republican party's
(forerunner of today's Democratic party) ascension to power. Adams felt that he
who controls the judiciary controls the philosophy of the government. See id. This
too appeared to be a philosophy endorsed by Ronald Reagan.
18. Id.

19. Marshall was the Secretary of State at the time of the appointment as well
as Chief Justice. Since there was so little time left in office after his own judicial
appointment, he held both offices for a period of several months. Id.
20. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137. The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 73,
conferred the original jurisdiction upon the Court on a Writ of Mandamus.
21. HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 249.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165 (1803).
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As scholar Daniel Hoffman points out, the Court recognized that

had this information been secret, disclosure may not have been
compelled. 23 However, since such was not the case and the question
was only the location of the appointment document, the question
of secrecy was irrelevant. 24 Thus, contrary to some commentators'

views, it was not an Executive Privilege question and the Court
certainly did not recognize the doctrine in any shape or form.
The next incident which directly confronted the concept of

Executive Privilege in a judicial context was the trial of Aaron
Burr. 25 Burr, Vice-President during the first term of Thomas Jefferson's administration, 26 was charged with treason in a scheme
involving the purchase of property in the newly acquired Louisiana
Territory. 21 Both Congress and the Judiciary demanded documents

relating to Burr. The most famous of the document requests was

for Burr's trial. A letter from General Wilkinson, a Burr confidant
and aide, was believed to be in the possession of the President. This
document was deemed essential to the proceedings. 28 President
Jefferson resisted turning over the Wilkinson letter. Jefferson argued it was wrong to call upon the President to produce private
correspondence, written to him, which contained confidential information. Chief Justice John Marshall sitting as theo trial judge
ultimately stated:

The President of the United States may be subpoenaed and

examined as a witness, and required to produce any paper
Although subject to the general rules
in his possession ....
23.

HOFFMAN,

24. Id.
25. See

supra note 10, at 250.

BERGER, supra note 3, at 187-93.
26. The election of 1800 was determined by the House of Representatives.
Jefferson and Burr had received an equal number of votes in the Electorial College.
Jefferson was chosen as President and Burr as Vice-President. Burr failed to win
renomination in 1804. His political efforts in this period were stymied in part by
Federalist Alexander Hamilton. After years of animosity Burr and Hamilton fought
their famous duel in 1804. The result was Hamilton's death and Burr's disgrace. 5
FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 63 (Norma H. Dickey ed. 1986).
27. Burr's actual plan and intent are even to this day unclear. It appeared that
called for the invasion of Spanish land when the United States and Spain
plan
the
went to war (which appeared imminent at the time). Burr would then either create a
new country in the Southwest, or seize Spanish America. He was arrested and charged
with treason. Six months later Burr was acquitted on September 1, 1807. Id.
28. BERGER, supra note 3, at 188. Berger argues rather persuasively that
contrary to the popular interpretation of this exercise of privilege, it was in reality
simply the state secrets doctrine at work. Id. at 189.
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which apply to others, [he] may have sufficient motives for

declining to produce a particular paper, and those motives

may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing its
production... . The occasion for demanding it ought, in

such a case, be very strong, and to be fully shown to the
29
court before its production could be insisted on.
This was the beginning of the mechanism under Executive
Privilege that allows the Judiciary to order an in camera inspection.30

In camera inspection has become a valuable tool in many cases
involving the government where there are a variety of privileges that
may be raised pertaining particularly to classified information. 3'

Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there
were numerous other occasions in various administrations where
Presidents exerted claims of privilege over materials. 3 2 These claims

centered upon congressional rather than judicial requests for information. While reinforcing the idea that the President has the power

to withhold information from Congress, they added little to the
development of Executive Privilege in the context explored in this

work and are relevant only for each event's own historical significance.

From the period beginning around World War'I, classification
of documents by the Executive Branch appear to be the next source
of authority for Executive Privilege.33 When the President could
29. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191-92 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
30. HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 252-54. Defined directly, in camera means in
chambers or in private. In an evidentiary context, it allows a judge to look at the
evidence in private and then rule upon its admissibility, relevance, privilege, or
discoverability. A hearing or trial may also be held in camera. This would be closed
to the public. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990).
31. This has been used in numerous cases dealing with not only Executive
Privilege but also with national security concerns. See infra part III.B.2.
32. For a list of the Presidents who did claim a form of Executive Privilege
see Respondent's Brief at 55 n.47, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos.
73-1766, 73-1834).
33. This was particularly true after 1912. In 1912, the War Department applied
confidential records status to various materials. In 1917, the Classification & Espionage Act saw the introduction of the monikers; secret, confidential, and for official
circulation only. In 1940, this military secrets classification system was brought under
the President's control and formed the basis for the World War I1 classification
system. See, e.g., Valerie M. Fogleman & James E. Viator, The Critical Technologies

Approach: ControllingScientific Communicationfor the National Security, 4 B.Y.U.

J. PUB. L. 293 (1990); Timothy J. Shea, Note, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and
REV. 657

Abuse of Classified Information in Criminal Trials, 27 AM. CRN. L.

UNITED STATES v. NIXON
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point to a security classification on the information itself, it was
quite persuasive. Under President Harry Truman the power to
classify was broadened to allow any part of the Executive Branch
to classify documents if they had some effect upon the national
security.
B.

34

PRE-WATERGATE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

It was the post World War II period of 1948-58 that provided
the genesis of modern Executive Privilege. There are three lines of

authority for Executive Privilege emanating from this period: Reynolds v. United States3 in 1953, President Eisenhower's 1954 direc-

tive accompanied by Attorney General Rogers' memorandum barring

some testimony by administration members before the McCarthyArmy Hearings, 36 and Justice Reed's opinion in Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Co. v. United States3 7 in 1958.
Reynolds v. United States was an action under the Federal Tort

Claims Act. 3 The widows of three civilian observers killed in the
crash of a United States Air Force bomber wanted investigation
documents.3 9 These documents contained crucial statements taken
from the surviving crew members after the accident. 40 The govern-

ment refused to provide the evidence. 4' The government claimed
that these materials were privileged from disclosure based upon the
need of national security. 42 The trial court found that "the facts on
the issue of negligence would be taken as established in the plain-

(1990); Theodore F. Kommers, Comment, Increased Press Access To Information Limiting the Range of Government Classification, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 217 (1992); Anthony R. Klein, Comment, National Security Information:
Its Proper Role and Scope in a Representative Democracy, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433
(1990); Renae A. Franks, Note, The National Security Agency and Its Interference
With Private Sector Computer Security, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1015 (1987).
34. See ORMAN, supra note 2, at 35-37. The National Security Act of 1947 and
the 1951 Executive Order designated the NSA and CIA. The 1951 Executive Order
allowed nearly anyone in the Executive to classify documents. President Eisenhower
later went back and reduced the number of agencies that could classify and changed
the scope to National Defense. This also redefined the classifications to top secret,
secret, and confidential.
35. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).

36.

BERGER,

supra note 3, at 234.

37. 157 F. Supp. 939, 943 (Ct. Cl. 1958).

38. 345 U.S. at 2.

39. Id.

40. Id. at 3.

41. Id.
42. Id.at 4-5.
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tiffs' favor" if the government failed to provide the documents. 43
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, looked at
the question of whether the Secretary of the Air Force should make
the determination as to which materials were privileged. 4 The court
ruled that there should be an in camera inspection of the documents
by the trial court rather than allowing the government to make the
determination. 45 The Supreme Court held that while "judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice
of Executive officers, "46 in camera inspection is waived where the
court is satisfied there is a "reasonable danger" that matters in the
interest of "national security" will be exposed. 47 The Court proceeded to advocate a balancing test that called for the weighing of
the necessity of the information against the privilege. However,
"even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are
at stake." ' 4 As Professor Hardin points out in his article Executive
Privilege In The Federal Courts,49 there is an inherent difficulty in
the trial court determining the necessity without knowing the nature
of the information sought.5 0 This is the modern roots of the national
security branch of Executive Privilege.
Another branch of the doctrine is that of the candor necessity.
This is used with regards to advisory discussions within the Executive
Branch in the determination of administration policy. The fundamental belief of this doctrinal branch is, without some confidentiality protections, officials and advisors will not speak freely in the
discussions necessary to formulate policy and make decisions. The
roots of the candor necessity branch of modern Executive Privilege
can be found in the Eisenhower administration pertaining to the
withholding of information in 1954 from Joe McCarthy's Army
Hearings." The McCarthy Hearings were a witch hunt.5 2 These

43. Id.at 5; see Paul Hardin III, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71

YALE L.J. 879, 892 (1962).
44. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3rd Cir. 1951).
45. Id.

46. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
47. Id.at 10.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
influence

Id.at 11.
Hardin, supra note 42.
Id.at 894.
BERGER, supra note 3, at 234-35.
From 1947 through much of the 1950's there was a fear of Communist
and infiltration that gripped the United States. Loyalty oaths, congressional
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hearings resulted in few, if any, Communists being uncovered and

ruined lives from New York to West Virginia to Hollywood. 3
Senator Joseph McCarthy had been allowed to conduct his inquisi-

tion with impunity beginning in the late 1940's. The Senator, along

with his chief counsel, the infamous Roy Cohn, had finally gone
too far by attempting to paint the Army as a hot bed of Communists

and "Fellow Travelers." 5 4 These accusations resulted in a Senate

investigation in 1954 on the improper use of power by McCarthy.
He counter charged that the Army attempted to blackmail him into
dropping the inquiry.55 The Senator demanded testimony from

administration officials regarding a strategy session on how to halt

McCarthy's activities. President Eisenhower directed that such discussions were privileged; to divulge them would have a chilling
effect upon the candor and advice the Executive receives. 5 6 This

simple claim which was able to stop a megalomaniac would later be

used to hide the scope of the Vietnam War and blatant acts of
illegality by the Executive Branch. 57

Finally, we find the roots of the phrase Executive Privilege in
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. v. United States.58 This action
concerned the discovery of documents containing Executive Branch
employees' opinions and recommendations on the sale of aluminum
manufacturing plants. Justice Reed, sitting by designation on the
United States Court of Claims, found that the information sought

constituted the thought processes and opinions of the administrator.5 9 "The power must lie in the courts to determine Executive
subpoenas to appear before committees investigating communists, blacklists, and
wrongful accusations of spying were all hallmarks of this period. Senator Joseph
McCarthy of Wisconsin, along with committee chief counsel Roy Cohn, was the
most vocal and damaging of those intent upon "saving" the country from the Red
Menace. Much of the paranoia appeared to have originally been rooted in the fear
of the U.S.S.R. acquiring the ability to manufacture atomic weapons. 26 FUNK &
WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 326-28 (Norma H. Dickey ed. 1986).
53. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY 23 (1992).
54. Id.
55. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 235.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 265-86, 366. See also Frank Askin, Secret Justice & the Adversarial
System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745 (1991). Both Presidents Johnson and Nixon
used Executive Privilege to hide the full scope of the war from Congress. Nixon was

particularly adept at this in concert with Henry Kissinger who was variously his
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. The invasion and bombings in
Laos and Cambodia were kept secret in this manner.
58. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
59. Id. at 946.
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Privilege in litigation. . . . [T]he privilege for intra-departmental.
advice would very rarely have the importance of diplomacy or

security.

'60

During the 1960's the Executive Branch from time to time
continued to make use of the Executive Privilege doctrine. It was
mostly in a congressional context and provided little evolutionary
movement. It was not however, until the Nixon administration that
the Executive Branch greatly expanded the doctrine. The culmination of this evolution manifested itself in the Watergate scandal
that engulfed the nation from 1972-74.
II.
A.

UNITED STATES V.

NIXON

6
WATERGATE 1

With the ultimate banal tawdriness of the story, Watergate
should have started out. . . It was a dark and stormy night. In
standing for reelection Richard Nixon was attempting to become
the first two term president since Eisenhower. The year was going
as planned. All the serious opponents had been effectively neutralized. 62 The President would stand for reelection against Senator
63
George McGovern. It wouldn't even be a contest.
60. Id. at 946. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 3, at 232; Hardin, supra note 43,

at 896.

61. There are numerous outstanding books on the events of Watergate. This
author has used the following extensively for background source material:

Journalists: BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTIEN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner
1974) [hereinafter WOODWARD, PRESIDENT'S MEN]; BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERN"
STEEN, THE FINAL DAYS (Simon & Schuster 1976) [hereinafter WOODWARD, DAYS].
Watergate Participants: JOHN M. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION (1976); G. GORDON LIDDY,
WILL (1980). Watergate Legal Figures: SAMUEL DASH, CHIEF COUNSEL (1976); SENATOR
SAM ERVIN, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION (1984); LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT &
THE POWER (1976). Miscellaneous Authors: HOWARD BALL, No PLEDGE OF PRIVACY
(1977) [hereinafter BALL, PLEDGE]; HOWARD BALL, WE HAVE A DUTY (1990) [hereinafter BALL, DUTY]; LEN COLODNY & ROBERT GETTLIN, SILENT COUP (1991); JAMES
DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW (1977) (author was a journalist who became press
spokesperson for the Office of the Special Prosecutor); FRANK MANKOWIEZ, UNITED
STATES V. RICHARD M. NIXON (1976) (author was a high ranking member of George
McGovern's Campaign Staff); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEM-

ORY (1992).
62. For an extensive discussion of the Nixon political dirty tricks operation see
WOODWARD, PRESIDENT'S MEN, supra note 61, at 117-66.

63. HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL '72
469-94 (Popular Library 1973). Cited pages are an excellent discussion of the nature
of the Nixon victory in 1972. Much of the text is a transcript of an interview between
Thompson and George McGovern less than a month after the election.
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On June 17, 1972, there was a break-in at the Watergate
complex offices of Larry O'Brien, Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee ("DNC"). 64 Frank Wills, the security guard
that night, came upon a taped door lock. 65 His discovery and
diligence to duty in calling the D.C. police resulted in the downfall
of a President. President Nixon's hands-on management style demanded that he be involved in the details of how to keep the scandal
contained. These acts of conspiracy, 66 combined with the paranoia

64. To this day, there is no agreement on what the real goal was of the bungled
break-in. The generally accepted explanation was that this was to either replace or
reposition an electronic bug that had been placed in during an earlier break-in. Other
explanations included one scenario where they were looking for incriminating documents the DNC had linking John Dean's wife Mo to a call girl ring. SCHUDSON,
supra note 61, at 25.
65. Id. at 26.
66. What today is known as Watergate actually consisted of a series of actions
characterized and unified by their abuse of power and corruption of authority. These
events included:
1. Huston Plan - a domestic intelligence operation designed to neutralize
the anti-war movement and enemies of Richard Nixon. Plans included
disinformation, electronic surveillance, kidnapping, infiltration, break-ins,
pilfering and opening of mail, and other acts designed to effectively end the
opposition to the Vietnam War and other Nixon policies. WOODWARD,
DAYS, supra note 61, at 34.
2. White House Plumbers - This group was to stop the incessant leaks to
the media. Actions included the illegal bugging of journalists as well as
members of the President's staff. They were also involved in using the IRS
to attempt to control those on the "enemies list." JAWORSKI, supra note
61, at 31-42.
3. Burglarizing-the offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Ellsberg was an obsession with the White House. He had leaked the
Pentagon Papers to the media. The puzzling aspect of this obsession has
always been that the report known as the Pentagon Papers was actually
highly critical and focused only upon the past Democratic administration's
management of the war in Vietnam. DOYLE, supra note 61, at 50.
4. Donald Segretti's "Merry Pranksters" - This was the campaign dirty
tricks team. They purportedly authored the Muskie 'Canuk' letter that
ultimately led to presidential candidate and for a time Democratic front
runner Senator Edmond Muskie to withdrawal from the presidential race in
1972, and extensive research (legal and otherwise) on Senator Ted Kennedy.
Some even believe that the leaking of Vice Presidential candidate, Senator
Thomas Eagleton's medical records showing past shock treatments for
depression were a product of this team. WOODWARD, PRESIDENT'S MEN,
supra note 61, at 117-35.
5. Campaign financing violations. There were massive divergences of funds,
monies taken from inappropriate sources, money laundering, slush funds,
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of a President in taping his own oval office meetings and phone
calls, created the most famous examples of Executive Privilege

claims .67

Before Alexander Butterfield's 61 revelation to Senator Sam Ervin's Senate Select Committee, revealing the existence of a secret
Oval Office taping system, the various investigations had come close
to stalling. 69 While the President and his men from the beginning
claimed that all the conversations and notes were privileged, the
evidence, even if discoverable, was at best, the interested parties'
subjective impressions of events. Congress certainly wanted testimony and the "truth," but it was opinion being sought. Only when
the existence of tapes surfaced did the situation become rancorously
contentious. The tapes of presidential conversations with advisors,
cabinet members and others could corroborate testimony in a manner notes or memos could not. These tapes represented a snapshot
in time limiting the number of interpretations on events. They could
answer the oft times repeated question; "What did Richard Nixon
know, and when did he know it?"
There were three litigations concerning various Oval Office
tapes. One concerned an attempt by Congress to obtain tapes.7 0
That suit had jurisdictional problems. The federal district court first
ruled that there was nothing in the law that allowed them to take
the case. 7 Congress ultimately had to pass legislation to give the
District of Columbia Federal District Court jurisdiction. 2 Even
after being provided with jurisdiction, the courts refused to provide

tax evasion, and what appeared to be influence peddling.
For an outstanding outline of acts and charges of Watergate see JAWORSKI, supra
note 61, app. A at 208-92.
67. Richard Nixon using Executive Privilege is no small irony. In 1948 while
Nixon was in Congress, he denounced President Truman's use of privilege in refusing
to provide information to Congress on the floor of the House. Nixon stated that
"[allowing this privilege] would mean that the President could have arbitrarily issued
an Executive Order in... the Teapot Dome case, or in any other case denying the
Congress information it needed to conduct an investigation of the Executive department." 94 CONG. REC. H4783 (1948).
68. Butterfield had been in charge of the taping system at the White House.
When he gave his testimony he was no longer at the White House but was with the
FAA. E.g., DASH, supra note 61, at 177-80.
69. During the fall campaign a Lew Harris Poll showed that only 3% of the
electorate found Watergate to be important. THOMPSON, supra note 63, at 474.
70. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
71. Id.
72. Pub. L. No. 93-190, 87 Stat. 736 (1973).
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Congress with any tapes. 73 Congress only received tapes and transcripts when the President proyided them or by special arrangement
between the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Judge Sirica, the
74
grand jury, and Congress.
The second litigation was by Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox. 75 The grand jury had been impaneled to bring indictments
against key participants in Watergate. 76 The grand jury needed the
tapes to determine who might be the culpable parties. Judge Sirica
ordered the production of the tapes.77
President Nixon appealed basing his claim upon the theory that
the materials were subject to "absolute Executive Privilege" and
that the Judiciary had no authority to order their production or
even inspection. 7 A divided court of appeals affirmed Sirica's
authority and decision. 79 The President chose not to appeal to the
Supreme Court but rather attempted to negotiate a settlement with
Special Prosecutor Cox. Nixon offered a written transcript (to be
made under Nixon's supervision) of the pertinent conversations. He
would allow a third party ° to authenticate the transcripts against
the original tapes, and thus provide Cox access to the information.8"
In exchange, according to the proposal, the Special Prosecutor
would agree to make no further demands for tapes.12 This set the
stage for the infamous "Saturday Night Massacre."
On October 19, 1973, Archibald Cox refused the White House's
compromise offer. 3 Saturday, October 20, Richard Nixon ordered
his Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, to fire Cox for his refusal.8 4
Richardson refused. The Attorney General cited the assurances he

73. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F.
Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
74. See, e.g., DASH, supra note 61; BALL, PLEDGE, supra note 61.
75. In re Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
76. This grand jury was to investigate the conspiracy and coverup of Watergate.
DOYLE, supra note 61, at 105-06.
77. Id.
78. BALL, PLEDGE, supra note 61, at 29-36.
79. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80. Nixon's choice for an "independent third party" was Senator John Stennis,
a strong Nixon supporter, who was nearly deaf, and in declining health due to
advanced age. BALL, PLEDGE, supra note 61, at 36-41.
81. DOYLE, supra note 61, at 169-73.
82. Id. at 169-70.
83. Id. at 169-90.
84. BALL, PLEDGE, supra note 61, at 41; DOYLE, supra note 61, at 190.
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had made to the Senate during his confirmation hearings regarding
the independence of the Special Prosecutor. Richardson had told
the Senate that only in the event of grave acts of misconduct by the
Special Prosecutor would he fire Cox. 5 In an act of personal
conscience, Richardson then resigned. Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus, next in the line of succession at the Department of Justice, was ordered to dismiss Cox. 6 He too refused.
Nixon fired him for failing to act upon the order of the President. 7
Finally, the White House ordered Solicitor General, and at that
point Acting Attorney General, Robert Bork, to fire Cox. He
complied."8
Congress and the American people were outraged. There were
immediate calls for impeachment.8 9 The rich irony of this episode
occurred in Judge Sirica's courtroom on Tuesday morning, October
23, 1973. The deadline for compliance with the subpoena for the
tapes was at hand. Nixon's attorney, Charles Allen Wright, shocked
everyone, including Judge Sirica, by stating that they would comply
with the order but would need some additional time. 90 A relieved
Judge Sirica quickly agreed. 9'
While the compliance with the grand jury subpoena for the
tapes took care of the Judiciary, Congress was now seriously
studying the impeachment process. The White House/Department
of Justice, in an attempt to placate both the Congress and the
American people, named a new Special Prosecutor, Leon Jaworski
92

of Texas.

It was Jaworski who instigated the third tape case that would
grow to be United States v. Nixon. By this time the grand jury (who
had demanded the earlier tape conversations) had handed down its

DOYLE, supra note 61, at 191.
86. Id. at 191-92.
87. Id.
88. In what may or may not be a bit of revisionist thinking, Bork has now
claimed that he was begged by both Richardson and Ruckelshaus not to resign. They
both urged him for the good of the office and the continuity of affairs that he go
ahead and fire Cox as it was clear that Nixon would find a way to dump the Special
Prosecutor. Id. at 191.
89. Tuesday October 23 and Wednesday October 24 there were 22 separate
bills introduced calling for an impeachment investigation by Congress. WOODWARD,
DAYS, supra note 61, at 459; BALL, PLEDGE, supra note 61, at 42.

85.

90.

BALL, PLEDGE,

91. Id.
92. See

JAWORSKI,

supra note 61, at 43-44.
supra note 61, at 1-88.
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indictments. 93 Unknown to the public, Richard Nixon had been

named an unindicted co-conspirator by the grand jury. 94 Jaworski
had to subpoena additional tape conversations for the trial of the
Watergate conspirators. 95
B.

UNITED STATES V. NIXON LITIGATION HISTORY

By May 1974, the President and his attorneys (first Charles
Allan Wright and then James St. Clair) had fought hard to protect

the tapes but ultimately capitulated at the last minute. This time
the stakes were different. Nixon, St. Clair and J. Fred Buzhardt,
White House Counsel, rightly believed, "the problem was the tape

case. [T]he courts, more than the impeachment inquiry [presented
the greatest risk]." 96 One hope St. Clair had was that Sirica would

quash the subpoena because "[b]y tradition, trial subpoenas carry
less weight than those issued by grand juries." 97 In fact, St. Clair
believed that Special Prosecutor Jaworski had blundered strategically over this matter. 98
Judge Sirica held the hearing on the motion to quash the
subpoena. St. Clair moved that the hearing be held in camera.
Jaworski agreed, stating that to "reveal the grand jury's action

(Nixon's unindicted co-conspirator status) while the House Judiciary
Committee was considering the evidence would be unjust."

moved the hearing to his chambers.

99

Sirica

As expected, the President claimed that the materials were

"within the constitutional privilege of the President to refuse to
disclose confidential information when disclosure would be contrary

93. Those indicted were: John Mitchell, former Attorney General and head of
Campaign to Reelect the President ("CREEP"); H.R."Bob" Haldeman, former
Chief of Staff to Richard Nixon at the White House; John Ehrlichman, former
assistant for Domestic Affairs to the President; Chuck Colson, former Special Counsel
to the President; Robert Mardian, CREEP official and former assistant Attorney
General; Kenneth Parkinson, CREEP Counsel; Gordon Strachan, former assistant
to H.R. "Bob" Haldeman and general counsel to USIA. Id.
94. JAWORSKI, supra note 61, at 134.
95. Id.

96.

WOODWARD,DAYS,

supra note 61, at 181.

97. Id. at 180.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 179. It is interesting to note that the Senate's tapes case was lost due
to similar logic. Judge Gerhard Gesell said that to allow the Senate access to the
tapes at that point in time would prejudice the criminal trials pending on Watergate.
See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp.
521 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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to the public interest."' 00 St. Clair then, shockingly and without
notice to the Special Prosecutor, proceeded to claim that since the
Special Prosecutor was an employee of the Executive Branch and
subject to presidential instruction, Jaworski had no legal standing
since the President had declared the tapes privileged. Jaworski was
outraged. Al Haig, 10' Nixon's Chief of Staff, had guaranteed as a
02
condition of Jaworski's employment, his right to sue for the tapes.1
Sirica refused to quash the subpoena on May 20, and ordered
production of the tapes. 0 3
Jaworski was reasonably certain that Nixon would appeal the
decision. The courts "were, by their nature, playing into the President's hands" with delay after delay.' 0 4 That fact, combined with
his outrage over St. Clair's surprise attack on his right to sue for
the production of evidence, convinced the Special Prosecutor that
the extremely rare (and many felt risky) step of an expedited appeal
to the United States Supreme Court was in order. 0 5
At 4:15 p.m. Friday, May 24, 1974, St. Clair, on behalf of the
President, filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. When Phillip Lacovara, Jaworski's Chief Counsel, got word of the filing, he made a call to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court. He told the Clerk, "[we] have a
request for an expedited hearing before the Justices.' ' 0 6 The Court
closes at 6:00 p.m. Lacovara and four others worked furiously
assembling the briefs requesting certiorarion an expedited basis. At
precisely 6:00 p.m., he rushed up the long flights of dignified steps
07
before the Supreme Court to hand the Clerk the papers.
To ask the Supreme Court to bypass the court of appeals was
extraordinary. The Court had only granted such requests on six
occasions, the most recent having been in the Steel Seizure Case

100.

BALL,

DUTY,

supra note 61, at 73 (citing

CONGRESSIONAL

QUARTERLY,

619 (1975)).
101. Then Richard Nixon's Chief of Staff, Haig had been the intermediary who
negotiated between Jaworski and the administration to accept the position of Special
Prosecutor. Haig later went on to serve as Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan.
102. Id. Not only had Haig made the guarantee with presidential approval but
in Jaworski's Senate confirmation hearings the Senate had also been assured of this.
103. United States v. Nixon, 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D.D.C. 1974); BALL, DUTY,
supra note 60, at 74.
104. WOODWARD, DAYS, supra note 61, at 182.
WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS

105. Id. at 181-183.

106. Id. at 183.
107. Id.
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during President Harry Truman's administration. 0° This request for
an expedited certiorari was premised upon the arguments that the
Watergate criminal litigation would be unreasonably delayed, the

case was destined for the Supreme Court even if adjudicated by the
court of appeals, and that because of the unique nature of the
events, the government would become debilitated if the proceedings
were delayed to allow for the usual method of review.109 On May
31, the Court announced it would take the case with arguments
scheduled for July 8, 1974.1 °
1. Nixon's Arguments

The President and his counsel firmly believed that the tapes
dispute was an internal disagreement. In their view, it was the
equivalent of a boss-subordinate dispute."' Consequently, the defendant argued that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction in the
matter due to the lack of a controversy (all the parties were in
Executive Branch) and that the dispute represented a political ques-

tion." 2 The President argued that since Special Prosecutor Jaworski

108. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). This was
during the Korean conflict and Truman had seized the steel companies in order to
settle a crippling strike. It was a showdown over the separation of powers. Congress
had recently enacted legislation that dealt with the resolution of labor actions. Truman
felt that the Korean Conflict represented a national emergency and that enabled him
to take decisive action. The other expedited cases were: United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936);
Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936); Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Alton Ry., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 294 U.S. 240
(1935).
Sup. Ct. R. 20 and 28 U.S.C §§ 1254(1), 2101(e) (1988) control requests for
expedited appeals. Because of the unique nature of an expedited request for certiorari,
there must be five Justices voting to grant certiorari. BALL, DUTY, supra note 61, at
74.
109. See Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (No. 73-1766).
110. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Chief Justice
Burger all voted to grant an expedited certiorari. Justices White and Blackmun felt
that the speed would harm the case and voted against granting certiorari. William
Rehnquist had recused himself from the case as he had not only close personal
associations with some of the parties but had also provided Nixon with some of the

basic Executive Privilege strategy. BOB WOODWARD
BRETHREN, 285-93 (Simon & Schuster 1979).

& SCOTT

ARMSTRONG,

THE

111. Respondent's Brief at 27-48, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(No. 73-1766) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
112. Id. The political question test is: 1. Is there a textually demonstrable
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was part of the Executive Branch and subject to presidential order,
his refusal to follow that order was an internal matter. Therefore,
the defendant claimed Jaworski did not enjoy the necessary legal
standing to obtain the materials in the courts. The question according to this argument centered upon what materials the prosecutor
needed for a criminal prosecution. Under this line of reasoning the
President is the ultimate authority on what materials are of a
confidential nature and thus unobtainable to another member of
the Executive. With this construction, the issue takes on characteristics of a basic separation of power question. According to this
rationale, the Court's intervention in this matter would constitute
inappropriate interference with the Article II powers of the Executive. Nixon stated that under the justiciability doctrine of political
question, this dispute was better resolved by the Executive Branch
itself. 113
The second argument centered upon the doctrine of Executive
Privilege. In a detailed discussion of the jurisprudential foundation
of Executive Privilege, Nixon asserted that the doctrine of Executive
Privilege exists within the Constitution and its invocation and
implementation is controlled exclusively by the President.," 4 The
claim postulated that because the Constitution vests all executive
power within the Executive Branch, there is a constitutionally protected privilege. Nixon argued that privilege was inherent in executive power. In a footnote the brief acknowledged that there was no
explicit privilege commensurate to Congress' Speech and Debate
Clause." 5 However, the defendant argued that the lack of enumerated language in the Constitution did not mean the founders had
failed to provide the privilege for the Executive. Rather it was
indicative of the privilege's fundamental nature that there was no
need to explicitly confer the privilege, it was so fundamentally
inherent within the office." 6 He postulated that since the President
constitutional commitment to another branch? 2. Is there a lack of judicially
discoverable manageable standards? 3. Is it impossible to decide without a nonjudicial policy determination? 4. Is it impossible to decide without showing a lack of
respect to other branches of government? 5. Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made? 6. Is there potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements from other departments? Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) compressed
the above into a three prong test.
113. Respondent's Brief, supra note 111, at 27-48.
114. Id. at 48-86.
115. Id. at 50 nn.34-36; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3.
116. To say this argument is convoluted would be kind. The argument seems to
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swears to "protect and defend the Constitution,"" 1 7 Executive Privilege is offered so that the Constitution may be fully defended from
encroachment." 8 This was premised upon a supposed traditional
and historical precedent for asserting Executive Privilege." 9 The

defendant postulated that since both the Judiciary and the Congress

have such a privilege, the Executive must also have the privilege. 2 0

He went on to insist that for the President to carry out his designated
duties, there must be a privilege that protects the private nature of

the discussions and communications involved. 2 ' Finally, the Presi-

dent asserted that the court may not force the production of
privileged material .122
2.

United States' Argument

The Government first stated that the Special Prosecutor is a

party separate and distinct from the President and the Executive

Branch in this situation. 23 In criminal prosecutions the prosecutor
represents the sovereign nation, not the Executive Branch. For that

reason the Special Prosecutor exists as an entity separate frorh the
say, contrary to the usual inference of assuming where there have been specific
privileges conferred to one branch and there is silence as to the others the assumption
usually made is that no conference is made. Nixon seemed to argue the opposite.
117. U.S. CONST. art. II § 1 cl. 8.
118. Respondent's Brief, supra note 111, at 50 n.35.
119. See supra part I.
120. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 111, at 59-68.
121. Here the counsel attempted to ground the privilege in the Constitutional
right of privacy as defined in the contraceptive case, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965). Specifically the brief pointed to Justice Douglas'. use of the
First Amendment "penumbra" of rights including privacy. Respondent's Brief, supra
note 111, at 59-68.
122. The President also spent a great deal of effort upon the idea that he may
not be subjected to any criminal proceedings as a sitting president except those of
impeachment. This argument was designed to expunge the grand jury's designation
of Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator. If only impeachment actions could be
brought, other proceedings would be invalid. Had this argument been successful the
designation of unindicted co-conspirator would then have been expunged. Respondent's Brief, supra note 111, at 95-137. One of the reasons for the desire to maintain
the co-conspirator status was that if the President was a co-conspirator under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, there would be far greater latitude in the admissibility of
evidence. This is particularly true with hearsay. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
if the statement is by a co-conspirator during the course of or in furtherance of the
conspiracy it is not hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
123. Petitioner's Brief at 24-45, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
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Executive. Because the parties were separate, there was the required
real and live controversy to provide appropriate standing for the
Special Prosecutor. An actual decision, not just an advisory opinion,
was required to resolve the question. This meant that not only was
the Supreme Court the proper situs for determination in this matter
of vital public importance but the only venue with sufficient prestige, authority and power to make and enforce a decision in this
matter.
The Government stated that it was both right and proper for
the Judiciary to determine the validity of a claim of Executive
Privilege when it is asserted in a judicial proceeding. 24 Courts by
their scope and nature have the right and power to resolve all
questions properly before them. It is for that reason that the
Judiciary must determine the validity of an evidentiary privilege. 25
Courts also have the power to order production of evidence from
the Executive when justice so demands.
The Government also pointed out that the President is subject
to the law. 26 Historically the courts have had the power to issue
subpoenas to all. There is no basis in either the Constitution or
within the intent of the framers to exempt the President from the
law. "27
' To argue that the President alone should make a determination of Executive Privilege applicability where he is an interested
party invites disaster.
Petitioner also argued in the alternative, that if there did exist
even this expansive Executive Privilege that Nixon claimed, the
materials over which the President was attempting to claim privilege
were outside the scope of that privilege. 28 These were a part of a
criminal conspiracy, not functions of state. As such, they could not
be subject to any protection of privilege through the office. 29 Even
where these materials were a product of the office and the privilege
applied, there must be a balancing of interests in the determination
of privilege, particularly where criminal proceedings are involved.
The public's interests would be best served here by the disclosure
of the materials. 30
124. Id. at 48-61.
125. Id. at 48.
126. Id. at 67.
127. Id. at 69.
128. Id. at 84.
129. Id. at 90. This is much like the exemption commonly found in the attorneyclient privilege. There exists no privilege where the conversation is to further a crime.
130. Id.at 103-116.
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Finally, the Government pointed out that since there had been

"pervasive disclosure" of Watergate matters with the President's
permission, any privilege that might have existed had been waived.' 3'

Along with the reality of public disclosure went the fact that the

other conversation participants, the defendants in the Watergate
criminal conspiracy trial (Mitchell, Erlichman, etc.), were hlso seek32
ing the disclosure of the materials.
3.

The Decision
The day after oral arguments the Justices met for conference.'

They were unanimous in their conclusions. The Court did have
jurisdiction in this case, Nixon must turn over the tapes, a limited
doctrine of Executive Privilege did exist but did not apply in this
case, and it did not wish to deal with the issue of Nixon's status as

an unindicted co-conspirator. 3 4 The difficulty now centered upon
who would write the opinion. Chief Justice Burger chose to assign
himself the opinion, as was his prerogative.' The resulting opinion,

131. Id. at 116.
132. Id.
133. A Supreme Court Conference is traditionally a private meeting between the
Justices. The Justices maintain their own record only for the purposes of assigning
opinions and reflecting the consensus within the opinion. When the Court is in
session there are conferences twice a week (one on Wednesday afternoon and one on
Friday). E.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: THE WAY IT WAS THE WAY IT Is (1987); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 109.
134. BALL, DUTY, supra note 61, at 111-13. While all agreed quickly to these
conclusions there was not a complete consensus as to the rationale. One area of
sharp disagreement was that of the FED. R. CRIM. P. 17-C standard required to
compel production of evidence. Powell advocated a higher standard for presidents
and White argued vehemently no. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 110, at
299.
135. The Chief Justice had ignored Justice Brennan's well reasoned suggestion
of a single unsigned opinion with all contributing, in announcing that he, Burger,
would author the decision. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 110, at 309-10;
BALL, DUTY, supra note 61, at 113. While Justice Brennan was distressed at the idea
of Burger writing the opinion, he was relieved at the unanimity of view and the
Court's belief that Nixon must produce the tapes. Brennan immediately and directly
after conference went to see his old friend Earl Warren. The former Chief Justice
was in Georgetown University Hospital gravely ill. Earl Warren had always been a
thorn in the side of Richard Nixon. He had only recently written of Nixon as, "the
most despicable President this nation ever had. He was a cheat, a crook, and a liar,
and he brought my country, which I love, into disrepute. Even worse than abusing
his office, he abused the American people." BALL, DUTY, supra note 61, at 113.
Justice Brennan shared with his friend the news. The Court would compel disclosure.
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while perhaps not the most intellectually rigorous, most eloquently
articulated, or passionately righteous, was unanimous in holding
that Richard Nixon must surrender the tapes and that there did
exist a limited doctrine of Executive Privilege. There was no way
Richard Nixon could claim this was anything but a definitive ruling.
He had lost.
For the first time the doctrine of Executive Privilege was
recognized by the Supreme Court. 3 6 While the Court acknowledged
that the Constitution does not explicitly provide a special presiden37
tial privilege rooted within, there is a confidentiality privilege.
This privilege "flows from the enumerated powers.' ' 38 This power,
combined with the architectural separation of powers, created the
foundation and authority for the doctrine of Executive Privilege.
The Court continued, however, by finding that this privilege
was not absolute. 3 9 The assertion of separation of powers and the
need for confidentiality of communications by themselves are not
adequate grounds for the invocation of the doctrine. The Court
stated that without a claim of
[a] need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national
security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument
that even the very important interest in confidentiality of
presidential communications is significantly diminished by
Warren responded "Thank God." Within a few hours the distinguished jurist was
dead. BALL, DUTY, supra note 61, at 113. Ultimately Chief Justice Burger, while
publicly claiming authorship, was forced to accept a decision written by committee.
Id. at 117-18.
136. As in many cases before the High Court, the threshold issue of justiciability
provided a starting point. The Court ruled that there was no barrier to justiciability.
The appointment of the Special Prosecutor stipulated that he could litigate to obtain
materials and the fact that the Attorney General and his appointees, function on
behalf of the sovereign nation, make this matter justiciable. United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 693-96 (1974). "The mere assertion of a claim of an 'intra-branch
dispute,' without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability
does not depend on such a surface inquiry." Id. at 693. There was obviously a
controversy to be resolved in the Court's view. Jaworski was suing as a representative
of the Sovereign State, not as a member of the Executive Branch. That fact took the
dispute out of the realm of intra-branch squabble. The Court also rejected the related
idea that this presented a political question. The Court found that the very nature of
the proceeding underscored the justiciability and lack of a political question. See id.
The application of the Baker v. Carr factors, see supra note 112, showed that this
was not a political question. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693.
137. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 706.
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production of such material for in camera inspection with
all the protection that a district court will be obliged to
40
provide.1
Continuing the evolution of the Reynolds doctrine,' 41 the Court
found that it was the Court's responsibility to determine the applicability of Executive Privilege. The Court stated that the President,
by demanding that he alone determine what is privileged, was
usurping the authority of the Judiciary. 42 "[It] is emphatically the
province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.' 1 43 The Court found that it was the Judiciary who held the
power to interpret when each branch's scope of power exceeds the
44
range authorized within the Constitution. 1
The Court then went on to examine the balancing and limits
required by the competing values. The Court held that the public
had an interest in maintaining a presumption of privacy in presidential communications. 145 According to the Court, the presumption
of privilege was "fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.' 146 This presumption was however, rebuttable, particularly
where criminal justice would be compromised by the allowance of
47
the privilege. 1
The Court also went on to limit the decision by stating,
we are not here concerned with the balance between the
President's generalized interest in confidentiality and the
need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that
between the confidentiality interests and the congressional
demands for information, nor with the President's interest
in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict
between the President's assertion of a generalized privilege
of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant
48
evidence in criminal trials.
140.
141.
privilege.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
This was the formalization of the National Security or State Secrets
See infra part I.B.; Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 703 (1974).
Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
Id. at 703-05.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. at 708-12.
Id. at 712 n.19.
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Even within this limited scope, the Court acknowledged the impor49
tance of confidentiality.
The Court then turned to examine the criminal prosecution
context of the case. The "President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications"' 5 0 must be balanced with that of the "fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of
justice."" '' The Court commented that since there was great specificity and material relevance to the subpoenaed conversations, as
well as a very limited number of conversations involved, the President's interests "will not be vitiated by disclosure."'5 Thus, the
balance tipped in favor of disclosure. The Court held that where
there existed only
[a] generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the
fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.'
The Court provided a procedural formula to apply in criminal
cases where Executive Privilege is exerted. This procedure is to
assure the proper application of the balancing requirement called
for by the Court. First, the material is subpoenaed. If the President
concludes that to comply with the demand would be "injurious to
the public interest," the claim of privilege may be invoked on the
return of the subpoena. 51 4 The district court will treat the material
as "presumptively privileged and require the Special Prosecutor to
demonstrate that the Presidential material was 'essential to the
justice of the [pending criminal] case."" 5 When the Prosecutor has
149. However, it went on to quote Justice Cardozo speaking of an analogous
situation: juror privilege.
A juror of integrity and reasonable firmness will not fear to speak his mind
if the confidences of debate are barred to the ears of mere impertinence or
malice. He will not expect to be shielded against the disclosure of his conduct
in the event that there is evidence reflecting upon his honor. The chance
that now and then there may be found some timid soul who will take
counsel of his fears and give way to their repressive power is too remote
and shadowy to shape the course of justice.
Id. at 712 n.20 (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933)).
150. Id. at 713.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 713.
155. Id. (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 192 (No. 14,694)).
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met this demand, the court may then order an in camera inspection
of the material. In camera inspection demands that the court treat
the materials in a manner that will prevent disclosure of privileged
the reinformation. After the admissible material is determined,
1 56
mainder should be returned to the President under seal.
III.

CONSEQUENCES

United States v. Nixon was an unusual decision on a number
of fronts. First, its unanimity of holding was extraordinary. All

eight Justices agreed"' not only on the holding but the rationale.
Historically monumental constitutional cases such as the Pentagon
Papers Case' and the Steel Seizure Case, 5 9 were complex by nature
and resulted in at least a variety of concurrences with each Justice

finding their own rationale for a common conclusion. Here there
was a single unanimous written opinion, a true accomplishment in
such a complex context where there were such widely varying
ideologies and perspective represented. Chief Justice Burger had

that held all these
succeeded in producing a committee document
60
disparate parts of the Court together.'
The opinion was also unique in that it was the first time the
President had been ordered to perform an affirmative act by the

Court.16 1 Usually the Court would avoid such an issue under the

justiciability doctrine where presidential power questions are concerned. 62 Unlike the Steel Seizure Case, the Court here was in fact

156. Id. at 715. Judge Sirica kept the Dean Materials and other "secret"
documents in his office safe. This was in reality a closet with a combination lock.
The Judge insisted that only he have the combination. Unfortunately the Judge had
great difficulty opening the lock and an Assistant United States Attorney would be
called in to open it. The combination would then be changed. The Iran-Contra
investigation used the same safe to seal investigation documents. JEFFREY TOOBIN,
OPENING ARGUMENTS 59 (1991).

157. There were only eight Justices who participated in the decision. Justice
Rehnquist had recused himself from the case. He had been an assistant Attorney
General under Nixon and had in fact formulated much of the Executive Privilege
argument at a much earlier stage in the crisis. He later spoke of his frustration at
not participating in such a major decision and being relegated to taking care of
administrative details concerning the case. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note
110.
158. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
159. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
160. BALL, DUTY, supra note 61, at 309-312.
161.

THEODORE C. SORENSEN,

ABILITY AFTER WATERGATE

162. See id. at 120.

WATCHMAN IN THE NIGHT PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNT-

121 (1974).
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affirming the existence of a special presidential privilege. It also
stated that the Judiciary ultimately must define the scope of privilege
particularly where national security was not at issue. The case was
not an inter-branch squabble, as in the Steel Seizure Case, but
rather the Executive Branch was staking a claim. Even though the
Court did in fact admit the presumption of privilege, it found that
the Executive Branch interest failed in the balancing test. It held
that the Judiciary could compel the President of the United States
163
to produce evidence just like any other citizen.
The immediate aftermath of United States v. Nixon was the
release of the June 23, 1972 conversation tape containing the
"smoking gun" conversation. 1' On August 9, 1974 Richard Nixon
resigned the Presidency. While his actions 'at the time were perceived
as having weakened the Presidency, Executive Privilege actually
empowered and isolated the office further.1 6s During the Ford and
Carter administrations, a smattering of confrontations between the
Executive and the Legislative Branches concerning Executive Privilege occurred. As the years have accumulated both Congressional
and Judicial permutations of Executive Privilege appear to have
substantively arisen with accelerating frequency.
A.

EARLY POST WATERGATE

During the ensuing six years of the early post Watergate period,
there was little use of the doctrine.1 66 There was but one occasion
in court where a claim of Executive Privilege occurred.
1.

67
United States v. Fromme

President Gerald R. Ford attempted to use the doctrine to avoid
testifying in the trial of Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme. 168 Fromme
163. The Court would later go on in Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425
(1977), to determine what control a past President could exert over "personal" tapes,
papers, etc. that were a product of the office.
164. This tape contained the Nixon/Haldermen plan to use the CIA to impede
the FBI's investigation of Watergate. JAWORSKI, supra note 60, at 457. It was this
tape that confirmed what John Dean and others had claimed. Richard Nixon, from
the beginning, was involved in the coverup of the Watergate burglary and ensuing
conspiracy. Id.
165. See generally SORENSEN, supra note 160. Through the post Watergate period
there was much discussion on the need to improve oversight, the use of special
prosecutors, ethics in government, and campaign reform. See id.; ORMAN, supra note
2; RALPH K. WINTER JR., WATERGATE AND THE LAW (1974).
166. It could have been called upon if there had been investigations or litigation
over the pardon issued to Richard Nixon.
167. 405 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
168. Fromme, a follower of Charles Manson, claimed to only be drawing
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had been charged with the attempted assassination of Ford. 169 The

defense counsel made a motion for the issuance of a subpoena to

obtain Ford's testimony on whether he heard a "click" or verbal
statements from the defendant. 170 Judge MacBride found that after
reviewing the affidavits and witness list in camera, that the defense
motion was reasonable and granted the subpoena.' 7' MacBride
stated, "no consideration of 'Executive Privilege' enters the equa-

tion at this stage of the proceedings.' ' 7 He found that United
States v. Nixon had shown that Executive Privilege was not an
absolute privilege. The judge had, particularly in a criminal trial,
the power within his discretion to set aside the privilege. 73 He held
that President Ford could provide his testimony on video tape and
that Executive Privilege would not serve as a bar. 74 This decision
was not appealed. It provides an example of the implied balance of
factors called for in United States v. Nixon.
2.

175

Nixon v. Administrator
The only Judiciary

76

based activity during the Carter Admin-

istrAtion was in the continuing battle between Richard Nixon and

attention to environmental issues. She pulled a gun on President Ford during a visit
to Sacramento, California. She pointed the gun at the President and pulled the
trigger. The weapon did not fire.
169. United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
170. Id. at 580-82.
171. Id. at 581-82.
172. Id. at 582.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 583. This concept of a President providing video testimony as a
compromise was seen again with former President Reagan in the Iran-Contra trials.
175. Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
176. Under the Carter administration, the most notable potential or actual claims
of Executive Privilege by President Carter were with Congress. The following incidents
represent the key episodes.
1. Investigation of Billy Carter - In 1980 President Carter's brother, Billy, was
investigated by the Senate for activities while he was a paid agent for the Libyan

Government.

JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH

532-33 (1982).

2. United States vote in the United Nations to condemn Israel - March 1, 1980, then
U.N. Ambassador, Andrew Young, cast a controversial vote condemning Israel. The
vote called for the dismantling of settlements on the West bank and referred to East
Jerusalem as occupied territory. Carter, on March 3, disclaimed the vote. The Carter
administration stated, that if the congressional inquiry was pursued in seeking
confidential documents, they would be forced to exert Executive Privilege. George
Lardner Jr. and John M. Goshko, Data on U.N. Vote Denied to Hill On 'Executive
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the government over who controlled the documents and tapes from
his office.177 Congress in 1978 enacted the Presidential Records
7
Act'1
to provide for the custodial protection of tapes, files, photographs, and other documents generated by the White House.
Nixon v. Administrator was related to the question of a former
President's ability to control the tapes and documents and claim
them to be confidential based upon Executive Privilege and ownership.' 79 The Court held that the legislation was constitutional and
that while notice and an opportunity to be heard were to be afforded
Nixon, the Administrator had the power to determine what information may or may not be released.' 8 0
B.

ACTIVE UTILIZATION

With Ronald Reagan's ascent to the Presidency, the doctrine
of Executive Privilege received a much greater work out.'8 ' The
controversies with the doctrine fell into four areas; 8 2 Congressional
Oversight,8 3 Judiciary-Civil Litigation,1 4 Judiciary-Criminal LitiPrivilege' Basis, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1980, at A21.
3. National Security Council files on General Alexander Haig Jr. - President-elect
Reagan had announced that Al Haig was his nominee for the Secretary of State. The
Senate Democrats had requested the files in anticipation of confirmation hearings.
Zigniev Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, refused. He said the request
was not specific enough and that he would not cooperate in "some indiscriminate
witch hunt." Adam Clymer, Brzezinski Rebuffs Senate's Democrats on Records on
Haig, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1981, § 1, pt. 1, at 1.
177. See Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). See also supra note 1
(concerning the recent United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia decision
finding the keeping of these documents to be a taking).
178. 44 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
179. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425.
180. Id. at 454-55.

181. Assistant Attorney General, Bradford Reynolds, advised the Reagan administration (and urged successors to do likewise) to use Executive Privilege more
often to resist congressional queries. He did admit that "at times there may well be
valid reasons to waive [executive] privilege, the current Iranian controversy suggests
itself as one such situation." Al Kamen, Executive Privilege Hailed, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 1987, at A16. In remarks to the Federalist Society convention in 1987, he
expressed the belief that the Executive turns over too much information without
looking into how "we might be undermining the capacity of this branch of government to conduct its business." Id.
182. This is the basic categorization that Archibald Cox applied to his original
analysis of the United States v. Nixon case. Cox, supra note 8.
183. In the congressional arena the most notable but by no means only examples
were as follows:
1. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") confrontation - This battle was
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gation, and Freedom of Information-Presidential Records Act. 85
over documents concerning Superfund clean up efforts. The Executive claimed that
the documents in question were a part of ongoing investigations, prosecutions, and
settlements. As such their disclosure could jeopardize those efforts. Congress went
to the Judiciary to have the EPA chair, Anne Gorsuch Burford, cited for contempt.
The question was ultimately negotiated. See ANNE BURFORD WITH JOHN GREENYA,
ARE You TOUGH ENOUGH? AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF WASHINGTON POLITICS (1988);
Ronald L. Clavelox, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional
Oversight: the Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333 (1983).
2. Chief Justice William Rehnquist's confirmation hearing - Certain concerns had

arisen about Rehnquist's involvement as assistant Attorney General under Nixon and
that administration's illegal domestic spy operations. There was also concern over a
conflict of interest over his participation in the Nixon v. Administrator case.

Rehnquist while in the Justice 'department had advised the Nixon administration on

matters involving the tapes (including strategy on the use of Executive Privilege). He
did recuse himself from the United States v. Nixon deliberations (see supra note 109)
but then in 1977 participated in the Administrator case. Reagan at first refused to
release any documents. In the end he allowed the committee to have a small number.
Richard L. Berke, Rarely Used Doctrine Is Cited, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1986, § 1, at

6; David Hoffman, Reagan Accuses Rehnquist's Critics in Senate Of "Hysterical
Charges, Political Posturing, " WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1986, § 1, at A14.
3. The Department of the Interior energy policy hearings - This case too was ultimately
settled with the White House providing a limited number of documents. Margot
Hornblower, White House Avoids Hill Showdown Over Documents, WASH. POST,
Mar. 17, 1982 § 1, at A5.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) explicitly held that it was not

speaking to the issue of a conflict between the President and Congress over Executive
Privilege. Id. at 712 n.19. However, the balancing approach utilized by the Court
could, by analogy, be applied to litigation between the Executive and the Legislative.
Until Watergate there was some question as to jurisdiction over cases compelling the
Executive to provide testimony or evidence. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying
text on Senate Select Committee litigation and jurisdictional legislation. With the
EPA controversy, litigation had actually begun in the D.C. District Court. It is not
clear how the contempt of Congress proceedings would have been resolved. The
dispute was settled with a compromise between parties.
184. In the first term of the Reagan administration there appears to have been
only one occasion where Executive Privilege doctrine was, claimed in court on civil
litigation. The American Telephone & Telegraph antitrust litigation showed a successful use of Executive Privilege. United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 524 F.
Supp. 1381 (D.D.C. 1981). Commerce Secretary, Malcolm Baldridge, was called as
a defense witness. His testimony was to show that the administration did not support
the continued litigation. Judge Harold Greene agreed with the government that his
testimony was barred on grounds of Executive Privilege. Baldridge would be testifying
to deliberations involving the President and that was a privileged communication.
Merrill Brown, Executive Privilege Claim Is Upheld in AT&T Case, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 1981 § Business & Finance, at D7.
185. During the Reagan term there is only one action that falls within the
Freedonr of Information-Presidential Documents category. It was an Executive Order.
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This section will explore the Judiciary-Criminal Litigation based
incidents relating to Executive Privilege since 1980.
1.

United States v. Wayte

s6

The highest profile Executive Privilege criminal case during the
first Reagan term was a draft registration compliance case.' 87 Late
in his administration, President Carter had reinstituted draft registration for all men eighteen years of age and older. As the Reagan
administration began to talk more menacingly of "providing support" to the Contras in Nicaragua, there began to be vocal oppo-

sition to the registration requirement. The Reagan White House
responded to this opposition with what they referred to as a "passive
88

enforcement policy." 9
In United States v. Wayte, the defendant argued that there was
a discriminatorily selective enforcementpolicy at work. 8 9 If proven,
the legal case would be defeated. Federal District Court Judge Terry

Hatter'

ruled that the defendant had managed a prima facie

showing of selective enforcement that shifted the burden of production to the government. The court ordered the government to
provide certain documents and testimony.' 9' Edwin Meese, counsel
to the President during the time in question, was ordered to testify
During the last two weeks of his second term, Ronald Reagan issued an Executive
Order assuring that former presidents could exert claims of Executive Privilege over
documents prior to either public release or release for litigation. Exec. Order No.
12,667, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1989), reprinted in 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (Supp. I 1989). An
interesting aspect of this order is that the President was at that time being asked by
Iran-Contra participants for testimony.
186. 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982) rev'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 1385
(9th Cir. 1983) rev'd, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
187. Stuart Taylor Jr., Draft Registry Case Enmeshes U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 1982, § A, at 11.
188. Id. That actually meant that if you were a vocal critic of registration, your
records were checked to determine if you were in compliance with the law.
189. 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
190. More recently Judge Hatter made the headlines with his decision in Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993). This
opinion stated that the Navy's practice of dismissing homosexual service members
based only upon their status was a violation of the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause. He implimented an injunction barring any further dismissals until the matter
could be fully appealed. At the time it was unclear whether the injuction was only
for that plantiff or for an entire class of individuals.
191. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1378 n. 1. Some of the documents had been provided
to the Judge for an in camera inspection. He also demanded that some documents
that were heavily censored needed to be provided in full.
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about the selective enforcement policy. The Department of Justice
claimed Executive Privilege on behalf of the administration in the

matter. The court held that if the government did not comply with

production, the case would be dismissed. 92 The ruling stated that
Executive Privilege "must yield to the defendant's specific need for

documents."'' 9 The court cited the balancing94 test articulated in

Nixon as the authority for this determination.

In the subsequent appeals which occurred in Wayte, both the
court of appeals and the majority opinion from the Supreme Court
ignored the Executive Privilege issue.1 95 Only Justice Marshall in his

dissent dealt with the crucial discovery issue. He stated "this case
'
is first and foremost a discovery dispute."'

96

Marshall further stated

that if Wayte made a prima facie case for selective prosecution and
the documents were shown to have relevance to the issue, "the

[question] is whether Wayte's need for the materials outweighed the
' 97 Marshall stated
Government's assertion of Executive Privilege.'

that in his view the case should be remanded back to the Ninth
Circuit to determine if the district court had proper findings on

discoverability. Marshall then went on to discuss what he viewed as
the "painstaking care"'' 9 in which the district court approached the

case, particularly the discovery issues. 199 Marshall felt, based on the
cold record, Judge Hatter had done a proper job of interpreting the

Nixon obalancing test and applying the doctrine of Executive Privilege. 20
2.

Iran-Contra '
20

The complex series of litigations and investigations concerning
Iran-Contra represent the most extensive and at the same time least
192. Id. at 1376. In addition to the Executive Privilege issue, the court also
found the registration law to be invalid due to a technicality. The case was overturned
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470
U.S. 598 (1985).
193. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1378 n.1.
194. Id. at 1378.
195. The courts and the government -were far more concerned that the lower
court had also invalidated the draft registration law. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385; Wayte,
470 U.S. 598. The district court had found that the law was invalid because of a
technicality in its implementation. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1378 n. 1.
196. 470 U.S. 598, 621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 622-23.
198. Id. at 625.
199. Id. at 625-31.
200. Id. at 624.
201. George Bush liked to brag that he was Ronald Reagan's "co-pilot" and
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explicit utilization of the doctrine of Executive Privilege since Watergate. As with Watergate and United States v. Nixon, it is crucial
to first understand the underlying events to the litigation.
a.

Iran-Contra: The Background
Ronald Reagan, in an attempt to keep Communists out of San
Antonio, vowed to help the Nicaraguan Contra Rebels overthrow
the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.2 °2 The United States had
been sending various forms of aid to the rebel forces. These forces
were based both inside Nicaragua and in Honduras near their mutual
border. The forces were variously known as the Contras or the
Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. Congress had fluctuated in its financial support to the Contras. During the 1980's there were limitations
placed upon and at times outright bans on funds going to these
groups. These legislative limits became known as the Boland Amendments. 20 3 Congress was led to believe by various Executive officials
20 4
that the United States was no longer providing military assistance.
the most involved Vice President in this country's history. Mary McGrory, A Ghost
at the Republican Feast, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1989, at A2. In terms of Executive
Privilege of the criminal litigation type, he may well be the most involved President
in history. Iran-Contra, Manuel Noriga's trial, Imelda Marcos' trial, and Iraq-Gate
(see infra note 257) all occurred during Bush's one term in office. While all the
litigations in these events had aspects touching upon Executive Privilege, it was the
events of Iran-Contra that most clearly illustrated the current status of Executive
Privilege in the Judiciary, as well as showing the hazards of the doctrine. For these
reasons this article will limit its discussion to only Iran-Contra.
202. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress On Central America, 1983 pt.
I Pub. Papers 601 (Apr. 27, 1983).
203. There were three sets of legislation designed to limit funding of the Contras.
These were collectively known as the Boland amendments. Boland I covered from
Sept. 27, 1982 to Dec. 7, 1983. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830. Boland II covered from Oct. 3, 1984 to
Dec. 3, 1985. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837. Boland III covered from Dec. 4, 1985 to Oct. 17, 1986.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190; § 8050.
Boland II effectively cut off all aid to the Contras.
For a legislative history of Boland see 133 CONG. REC. 4577-4990 (daily ed. June
15, 1987). For a detailed discussion of Boland and Iran-Contra see THE REPORT OF
THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT], MAJORITY REPORT AT 395, MINORITY REPORT AT

[hereinafter
489 (1987).

For a discussion of Boland and criminal charges see, TOOBIN, supra note 154, at 35;
Andrew W. Hayes, The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1584 (1988).

204. False testimony was the basis of the criminal litigation in Iran-Contra. See
(New York Times ed. 1987)[hereinafter TOWER];
CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 203; TOOBIN, supra note 156.
THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT
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During this same period there had been a number of United

States citizeng taken hostage in Lebanon during that country's
protracted civil conflagration. 20 5 The Reagan administration had, in
its own way, become just as obsessed about the Beruit hostages as

the earlier Carter administration had been about the Iranian hostages. 206 It was commonly believed that Iran held the key to the
hostage situation in Lebanon (as it had during the Carter Administration's hostage crisis). 207 Reagan had been steadfast in publicly
refusing to negotiate with all terrorists. Time and again the adminthey would never deal with terrorists or
istration harangued that
20 8
negotiate for hostages.
What linked these two foreign policy problems was the National
Security Council. 209 Oliver North, Robert McFarland, and, later,
205. In 1984 the following were taken hostage: Jeremy Levin, CNN; William
Buckly, CIA; and Benjamin Wier, a minister. In 1985 these men were taken hostage:
Fr. Lawernce Martin Jenco; Terry Anderson, AP; David Jacobson, American University; Thomas Sutherland, American University. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, MAJORITY
REPORT, supra note 203, at 160.
206. See id.; TOWER, supra note 204, at 18-20. Compare JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING
FAITH (1982).

207. See Tower, supra note 204.
208. "The United States gives terrorists no rewards and no guarantees. We make
no concessions. We make no deals." President Ronald Reagan. CONGRESSIONAL
REPORT, MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 203, at 161; N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1985, at
A10.
209. During the 1968 presidential election, Richard Nixon argued that "most of
our serious reverses abroad [are attributable] to the inability or disinclination of
President Eisenhower's successors to make use of this important [the National
Security] council." HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HousE YEARS 38 (Little Brown 1979).
The purpose behind the NSC is to provide the integration of diplomatic, military,
and intelligence information, opinion and expertise. Id. at 42-43. This group's
function is to make studies, advise, provide options and assess consequences in terms
of the national security. Id. Representatives of all relevant agencies are members.
Heading up this group is the National Security Advisor. As in any situation where
the label national security arises, the challenge lies in defining the scope of the
authority. Id. Nixon began the practice of using the NSC to circumvent the Congress,
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), State Department, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
COLODNY & GETTLIN, supra note 61, at 4-17. This group is under complete White
House control. The statutory members of the NSC are cabinet officers and thus
subject to Senate confirmation. It is the National Security Advisor and actual NSC
staff who as presidential appointees are not subject to confirmation. It is also these
appointees who control the information and thus not only the Council but policy as
well. Id. at 6. This affinity for control and secrecy was to reappear in the NSC
during the Reagan administration. Former Secretary of State George Shultz recently
wrote, "as I had sensed in the days when Henry Kissinger was National Security
Advisor, a cult of secrecy verging on deception had taken root in the White House
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John Poindexter, carried out a complex plan to accomplish the
release of the hostages and fund the overthrow of 'the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua. They sold Iran arms through Israel, took
the profits and purchased arms for the Contras. In this fashion the
Ayahtola paid for the efforts to overthrow Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega.

210

In early November of 1986 a press story out of the Middle East
claimed the Reagan White House had traded arms for hostages.2 1 1
On November 25, 1986, President Reagan and Attorney General
Edwin Meese announced at a press conference that they had indeed
sold arms to the Iranians212 and, they had turned around and used
the proceeds to fund arms for the Contras. 213
b.

Investigation and Litigation

In an attempt to ascertain the scope of the scandal and avoid a
repeat of Watergate, an independent counsel was appointed, Judge
Lawrence Walsh. 214 His mandate was to investigate and prosecute
those who had committed crimes either in the original act or, as in
Watergate, in the coverup of the scandal. The following table provides
a synopsis of the litigation efforts that grew out of the Iran-Contra
investigations and the impact of Executive Privilege upon the cases.

and NSC staffs." GEORGE SHULTZ, TURMOIL & TRIUMPH 12 (1993). The NSC in the
ensuing 20 years has taken on more and more of an operational and decision making
role. This is evident by such acts as the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (a sub group of
the NSC) deciding that the CIA should mine the ports and rivers of Nicaragua and
then informing the Secretary of State. Id. at 306-09.
210. TOWER, supra note 204.
211. AL-SHIRAA, a Lebanese magazine reported on Nov. 3, 1986, that the United
States had sold arms to Iran to gain the release of hostages held in Lebanon.
CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 203, at xv.
212. The cover story the administration stuck with was that this arms deal was
to help warm relations with Iran and to help solidify the power base of the more
moderate elements in the Iranian government. To date the former President and his
former Vice President (former President Bush) refuse to acknowledge that this was
in fact a weapons for hostages trade with Iran. Former Secretary of State George
Shultz has repeatedly stated that this action could not be characterized in any other
fashion.

GEORGE P.. SHULTZ, TURMOIL & TRIUMPH

839 (1993).

213. Id.; TOOBIN, supra note 156, at 3-5.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1992). In the post Watergate reforms the Ethics in
Government legislation had formalized the office of Special Prosecutor into the
Office of Independent Counsel.
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Iran-Contra Litigation Table
Party

Action

Exec.

Conviction

Appeal

Priv.
Oliver North,
National Sec. Council

Trial & Conviction
Overturned

Yes

Yes on conspiracy
and fraudulent
acceptance of security
fence.

Convictons
overturned on 2
Kastigar grounds "

John Poindexter.
National Sec. Council

Trial &
Conviction
Overturned

Yes

Yes on conspiracy
and lying to Congress
as well as preparing a
false chronology.

Convictions
overturned On
Kastigar grounds

Casper Wienberger,
See. of Defense

indictment &
Presidential Pardon

Potential
was
great

Four charges of
perjury and making
false statements to
Congress.

Clair George,
CIA. Deputy Dir. of
Operations

Trial &
Presidential Pardon

Potential

First trial ended with a
hung jury. Conviction
in second trial on two
felony counts of lying
to Congress.

Robert McFarland,
National Sec. Council

Plea Bargain &
Presidential Pardon

Potential

Four misdemeanor
courts of withholding
information from
Congress.

Richard Secord,
middleman

Plea Bargain

Potential

False statements to

Albert Hakim.
middleman

Plea Bargain

Potential

Misdemeanor charge
of illegal money given
to North.

Alan Fliers.
CIA. Central American
Task Force Chief

Plea Bargain &
Presidential Pardon

Potential

Two misdemeanor
counts of withholding
Information from

Plea Bargain &
Presidential Pardon

Potential

Elliot Abrams,
State Department

investigators.

Congress.

Two misdemeanor
courts of withholding
Information from
Congress.

Duane Clarridge
CIA. European Div.
Chief

Indictment &
Presidential Pardon

Potential

Seven charges of
perjury and making
false statements to
Congressional
investigators.

Executive Privilege on the surface plays a very shadowy role in
investigations and litigations. During the congresIran-Contra
the
215. This is the determination that the immunized testimony in another proceeding, in the Iran-Contra context that of congressional testimony, improperly influenced
the investigation, trial preparation and/or trial proceedings in an inappropriate
manner. See TooBIN, supra note 156, at 57-60.
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sional investigation, President Reagan appeared before the Joint
Investigating Committee and gave testimony. 216 The Executive Branch
provided the bulk of the materials both for Congress and the Office
of the Independent Counsel. It was only the subpoenas naming
Presidents Bush and Reagan that actually brought about the overt
discussion of Executive Privilege. The first occasion was with Judge
Gerherd Gesell in the Oliver North trial. 17
i.

North Litigation

The North trial was the highest profile of the Iran-Contra litigations. The obstacles facing the prosecution (of this and the other
related cases) included, partial immunity granted by Congress in
exchange for North's and other key figures' testimony, the classified
nature of materials relating to national security, and the constant
threat of Executive interference with the prosecution."'
Oliver "Ollie" North, a Marine Lieutenant Colonel, Vietnam
war hero, Naval Academy graduate, and National Security Council
("NSC") staff member,2 19 was responsible for raising covert aid to
the Contras and facilitated the Iranian arms deal. He was the implementor, and some would say architect, of the grand schemes that
later became known as Iran-Contra. The North prosecution centered
upon false statements to Congress and the improper handling of
money.

220

Much of the pre-trial wrangling centered upon classified materials. 2 2' These materials, in some cases, could have been subject to
claims of either the State Secrets Doctrine or the national security
prong of Executive Privilege.2 22 These disputes were resolved through
216. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 203.

217. TOOBIN, supra note 156, at 59. This jurist had handled some of the
Watergate litigation. He dismissed the Senate Select Committee's cases suing for the
production of the Nixon tapes.
218. The "interference" that most concerned the prosecution was that of a
Presidential Pardon. Id.
219. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 203, at 36.

220. United States v. North, 716 F. Supp. 644, 651 (D.D.C. 1989). Although
these actions were most likely in violation of the various Boland Amendments, North
was never charged with such act.
221. E.g., United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See Ronald

K. Noble, The Independent Counsel Verses the Atiorney General in a Classified
Incorporation Procedures Act-Independent Counsel Statute Case, 33 B.C. L. REV.
539, 552 (1992). See generally ToOBIN, supra note 156.
222. White House briefing by Marlin Fitzwater, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Nov.
22, 1988.
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23
a combination of compromise, consensus, and judicial discretion.
There was, however, a demand by North for testimony from President
Reagan.2 24 Hearings were held to determine the enforceability of the
subpoenas. 225 Reagan, to this point, had been very cautious not to
use Executive Privilege.2 26 But in this case he argued that the conversations, writings, etc., were subject to Executive Privilege and therefore the subpoenas should be quashed.
Judge Gesell however ruled that Reagan's testimony was not
material to the defense and that there were alternative means to bring
into evidence the information the defense was attempting to bring
forth.2 27 Gesell had quickly seized upon these alternative grounds, and
claimed that Executive Privilege was not the basis for decision. The
opinion, however, shows an eery similarity in its analytical framework
22
to the balancing called for by the Nixon case and found in Wayte. 1
An example of this is the discussion of the availability of the evidence
from other sources. The court cited the fact that such information
had been revealed by the prosecutions' case and referenced the
229
interests of all parties. These are Executive Privilege balance factors.
For all intents and purposes this appears to be the deliberative-candor
branch of Executive Privilege. Also lurking about in the discussion is
the national security-diplomatic affairs exemption outlined in Nixon
by way of Reynolds. 2 0 The very nature of the case could have allowed
an exclusion of much of the evidence on this basis because the
information sought dealt with numerous foreign powers, diplomatic
relations, and security considerations.
North's case did reach a jury. He was found guilty of shredding
documents, illegal acceptance of a security fence, and aiding and

223. TooBIN, supra note 156.
224. Philip Shannon, North Subpoenas Face Fight by White House, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1989, § 1, at 12.
225. There is some dispute as to whether Executive Privilege was actually
formally asserted. Toobin, in his book states that it was, but Judge Gesell found
alternative grounds upon which to rule. TooBIN, supra note 156, at 274-76. Judge
Silberman, in United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 946-54 (D.C. Cir. 1990), asserts
that the claim was never formally made and that Gesell improperly used the criteria
of overriding Executive Privilege to quash the subpoena. This served as the basis for
Silberman's vote to overturn North's conviction on count 10 of the charge.
226. E.g., Douglas Cater, When Congress Shouldn't Know, WASH. POST, Aug.
17, 1987, at A19.
227. United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1448 (D.D.C. 1989).
228. For a discussion of Wayte, see part 11I.B.1.
229. North, 713 F. Supp. at 1449.
230. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
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abetting in the creation of a false chronology of events. 231 The verdict
was overturned on appeal. 23 2 One of the underlying rationales the
court used to overturn the conviction was the lower court's improper
use of the Executive Privilege doctrine. 233
ii.

Poindexter Litigation
The other Iran-Contra litigation in which Executive Privilege
played a clear role was that of National Security Advisor, John
Poindexter. Poindexter had been Ollie North's boss at NSC. 23 4 Poindexter was charged with conspiracy and making false statements to
Congress. 235 He subpoenaed both Reagan and Bush as well as diaries
Reagan had kept while President. 23 6 Again, the by now former President went to court to quash the subpoenas. There was, however, an
offer made to allow Judge Green to preform an in camera inspection
of the diaries to facilitate a resolution of the matter. 23 7 The court
ultimately ordered the production of some of the entries and thus
overruled the claim of privilege.
Reagan's attorneys had argued also that a former sitting president
could not be subpoenaed into involuntarily testifyingin open court. 23
231. United States v. North, 716 F. Supp. 644, 651 (D.D.C. 1989). He was

origninally sentenced to 1200 hours of community service and fined $150,000. TOOBIN,
supra note 15.6, at 342-44.
232. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The basis for the
action was an improper Kastagar hearing by Judge Gesell. The Kastagar hearing was
designed to ensure that the case and witness testimony was not based upon or
impacted by the immunized congressional testimony given during the congressional
hearings.
One of the three judge panel, Judge Silberman, found that Gesell had improperly
used Executive Privilege standards in quashing the Reagan subpoena. Id. Silberman
had overturned the Independent Counsel law in 1988 (the Supreme Court reversed
his ruling) and had also been an aid in the Reagan White House. While Robert
McFarland was a Senate staffer he arranged a secret meeting between Silberman and
some Iranians to discuss the hostage situation. Jefferson Morley, Reagan v. Walsh,
246 THE NATION 556 (1988); Peter Swire & Simon Lazarus, Reactionary Activism,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1988, at 17.
233. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J.,
concurring).

234.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT,

supra note 203;

TOWER,

supra note 204. See supra

note 209 for information on the National Security Council.
235. United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp 1470, 1473 (D.D.C. 1989).
236. Judge Harold Greene who heard the Poindexter case was also the jurist
who had ruled that Malcolm Baldridge's testimony was privileged in the AT&T case
in 1981. See Brown, supra note 184.
237. United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D.D.C. 1990) and 732
F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1990).
238. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. at 142.
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While technically not a claim of Executive Privilege, it was intertwined
with the privilege and if compelled to testify, certainly some of the
testimony could be claimed as privileged. The court's compromise
was that the testimony would be a closed video taped deposition in
allow resolution of any Executive
the presence of the court. This would
23 9
arose.
Privilege claims as they
Greene's opinion went to great lengths to say that the official
must explicitly claim Executive Privilege and that such a claim was
not present in this situation. 240 Like Judge Gesell's opinion, Greene's
opinion seemed to implicitly apply the Nixon balancing formula while
disingenuiously disclaiming the use of the doctrine. Like North, John
convicted only to have the conviction
Poindexter was ultimately
241
appeal.
overturned on
iii.

Other Litigation

The trial of former Secretary of Defense Casper Wienberger,
242 may
prevented by Bush's Christmas Eve pardon of Wienberger,
well have presented the greatest Executive Privilege challenges. With
the defendant's cabinet officer status not only would he have had
difficulty getting at needed evidence from Bush or Reagan, but the
prosecutor may have also faced substantial difficulty in obtaining
relevant evidence. It could well have been that the defendant would
have claimed Executive Privilege on his own behalf as to his dealings
with subordinates and that Presidents Bush and Reagan could have
argued improper disclosure and Executive Privilege on the former
Secretary of Defense's dealing with them as an advisor.
If there are any surprises about the utilization of Executive
Privilege in the Iran-Contra cases it is the apparent apprehension of
the courts to acknowledge their use of the doctrine. To find the role
of the doctrine in these events requires a sensitivity for the subtlety
and nuance of what the actual underlying framework these opinions
are predicated upon. 243 The doctrine of Executive Privilege appears to
239. Id. It is not clear from the available public record if any areas were ruled
privileged under the doctrine during the deposition.
240. Id. at 146-48.
241. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
242. The Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at A22; Walter Pincus, Bush
Pardons Weinberger In Iran-Contra Affair, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al;
George Lardner Jr., Walsh Wants To Question President, WASH. POST, Dec. 27,
1992, at Al; David G. Savage, Bush's Refusal On Notes Not Crime, Experts Say,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al.
243. At times there seems to be a quality much like the Wizard of Oz; "Pay no
attention to the man behind the curtain."
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have been inherently relevant to these events. The difficulty lies in
documenting the scope of the use.
IV.

LESSONS, TRAPS, AND CONTAINMENT

Professor Raoul Berger's contention that Executive Privilege is
not found within the Constitution and may not be rooted in the
document, is most likely correct. 2" However, the pragmatic reality is
the doctrine is here, it is recognized by the Supreme Court, and it
must be effectively contained.
Privileges by their very nature are an anathema and represent the
antithesis of our founder's judicial philosophy. 45 The concept of
evidentiary privileges serves to foster an underlying social or governmental policy goal. 24 The traditional privilege of marital communications is meant to reinforce and reduce stress upon a marital
relationship. 241 Clergy-Penitent, Doctor-Patient, and Attorney-Client
are all privileges that are meant to foster and facilitate the role or
service of the relationship. 24 The concept of Executive Privilege, while
based upon the relationship and nature of the position, is unique and
distinct in its ability to so completely control the possible prosecution
and investigation of wrongdoing at the highest levels of government.
It is also unique in that it may well be the broadest and most
deferentially applied of all privileges.
A.

PROBLEMS

The Court in United States v. Nixon 249 did attempt to narrow the
privilege as viewed by Richard Nixon. It utilized a balancing test, 250
pointed out the inapplicability of the doctrine in illegal acts, 25' and
called for the extensive utilization of in camera inspection. 2 2 It did
however leave wide open the areas involving national security, diplomatic affairs, and military matters. 253 By apparently leaving intact or

244. BERGER, supra note 3.
245. Id.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES

See Id. at 753.
Id. at 731-881.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 706.

731 (3d

ed. 1991).
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maybe even expanding the Reynolds decision of 1953,254 the Court
limited when the Judiciary could call for the important tool of in
camera inspection in the dangerous area of national security .2 " Depending upon how broadly the language is read, it may be argued
that where the President claims the material is within the purview of
security, military, or diplomacy the Judiciary may not be empowered
to perform an in camera inspection. 256 This amounts to a massive
escape clause.
As illustrated by Iran-Contra 25 7 and the Wayte draft litigation,258
much of the litigation concerning Executive Privilege in recent years
falls into the vagaries known as diplomacy, national security, and
military matters. It could in fact be argued that the United States v.
Nixon holding is so narrow in its Executive Privilege limitation, that
it only limits the doctrine in the same fact situation, a President
involved in a criminal conspiracy limited to domestic matters. In the
areas where the President has traditionally been the dominant power,
the triad of national security, diplomatic affairs, and military matters, 259 the office retains the broadest privilege to protect communications.
Even where the matters may appear to fall within the shared
power scheme as with domestic affairs and thus by their nature call
for closer scrutiny, the magic phrases of national security, diplomatic
affairs, and military matters may be used as a shield.2 60 The Iraqi
loan guarantee investigations2 6I are an example. The investigation
254. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). See supra part 1.B (discussing
the Reynolds case and the restrictions placed upon the courts in the determination
and application of the State Secrets branch of the doctrine).
255. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
256. 345 U.S. at 10 (1953).
257. See supra part Il1.
258. See supra part II.B.I.
259. See HAROLD HONGJUT KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990).
260. See id.
261. At the time of writing, summer 1993, the Iraqi loans litigation had just
been revived. Christopher Drogoul, former head of the Atlanta branch of the Italian
government's Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, had originally plead guilty to fraud
charges in the Iraqi agricultural loan case but withdrew that plea and is scheduled to
begin trial on September 8, 1993. On July 13, 1993, it was announced that he was
subpoenaing former President George Bush. It is the defendant's contention that the
United States government, along with Italy, Britain and Germany, formulated the
agricultural loan scheme to help arm Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). The
subpoena is for both Bush's testimony and documents believed to be in his possession.
It has been widely rumored that Bush will claim Executive Privilege and refuse to
testify or provide documents. Bush Subpoenaed in Iraqi Loans Case, CHI. TRIB.,
July 14, 1993, § 1, at 5.
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currently centers on not only the transaction itself but also what was
done by the Department of Justice to impede the investigation. The
Executive Branch could legitimately claim that those loan guarantees
and the activities surrounding them are in fact diplomatic, national
security, and military in nature.
Former Vice President J. Danforth Quayle's Competitiveness
Council showed the breadth of the exemptions. There had been calls
for investigations into the regulation waivers granted to individual
businesses as well as industries by this group. The Council claimed
that the reasons and rationale for the exemptions are deliberative in
nature and as an Executive advisory body they are subject to Executive
Privilege. Retaining a viable economy, maintaining strategic industries, and fostering technological superiority are foundational to the
United States surviving as a superpower. That is a function of national
security, it may well be a military matter, and where there are
international business and trade ramifications, it could be legitimately
argued that these are diplomatic matters.
Even the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") action in
the early 1980's262 could be described and categorized in a manner
such that the requested testimony and documents would fall within
the escape clause. The EPA deals with all types of toxic waste.
Superfund has been used to clean up radioactive waste. Nuclear waste
particularly from military sites such as Rocky Flats are military
matters. The clean up of toxic waste sites could thus fall under the
national security moniker.
The deferential nature of the Judiciary is the second major
problem with the application of the doctrine. The Judiciary Branch
shows extreme deference toward both the Executive and Legislative
branches of government. It is because of that deference that the edicts
of the Judicial Branch have the power that they do.263
This deference has shown itself in a variety of mechanisms. The
justiciability doctrine has traditionally provided a variety of tools to
allow the Supreme Court to stay clear of the inter-branch type
disputes. 2 64 Ripeness, political question, and standing all allow for the
Court to pay deference to the coordinate branches by simply refusing
to address the question and yet appear to have a quasi legal reason
for doing SO.265
262. See supra note 183.
263. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.

ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

54-65

(4th ed. 1991).
264. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.

486 (1969).
265. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 263.
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Most commonly, the deference found in the Judiciary has been
found in the application of balancing tests and rationality. This has
been shown repeatedly in deference to Congress in the areas of Scope
of National Power, Commerce Clause, Due Process (both substantive
2
and procedural), Equal Protection, and the Tax and Spend Powers. 6
This deference has also been seen with the Executive and is analogous
to that in the application of Executive Privilege.
It is only the most egregious cases that have caused the courts to
set aside the claim of privilege. In United States v. Nixon the Court
had to command the production of the tapes. The decision reflects
more the pragmatism of the moment. 267 The President of the United
States was on the verge of being impeached and convicted for high
crimes and misdemeanors against the nation. 2 8 The prosecution of
his minions who committed crimes of conspiracy and criminality
necessitated proof of what governmental-campaign officials knew and
when they knew it. There was a strong inclination among the more
conservative Justices to limit the decision to allow for the greatest
viability of Executive Privilege doctrine possible. Chief Justice Burger
particularly wanted to allow the concept of an absolute privilege. 269
The result of this deference may be seen in the frequency that
Executive Privilege, particularly in recent years, has been allowed.
Judge Hatter in his opinion in Wayte v. United States270 stands out
in stark contrast. He refused to allow the Executive to claim privilege.
Even in that case, the court of appeals, 2 71 and as Justice Marshall
eloquently points out, the Supreme Court, refused to address what
appears to have been the fundamental issue of this evidentiary appeal
with a claim of privilege. 272 Only in the rarest of cases has the Judiciary
sided with those seeking disclosure. While certainly some would argue
that is evidence of the Executive's selectivity in the use of the privilege,
that conclusion is self-serving. The reality of Washington has often
shown that much of what is classified or claimed as privileged is only
so labeled to prevent the political embarrassment of the sitting Pres-

ident .273

266. Id.
267. See generally SCHUDSON, supra note 61;
268. See generally SCHUDSON, supra note 61;
61.

269.

270.
271.
272.
273.
(1974).

See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG,

supra

BALL, DUTY,
BALL, DUTY,

note

110;

supra note 61.
supra note 61.

BALL, DUTY,

supra note

549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
Wayte v. United States, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 621 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See generally Symposium, United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 4
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The practical effect of such deference in the allowance of Executive Privilege is also problematic. Evidentiary requests that are
subject to Executive Privilege are customarily important. Because of
the mechanics of discovery, where a subpoena has been issued against
the President or a member of the Executive, and the court finds merit
in the moving party's request, this generally reflects a court determination that the information is crucial and cannot be obtained any
other way.174 The information is often so fundamental in importance
that its production is necessary to prove the relevant aspect of the
moving party's case. In allowing the exercise of the privilege, the
Judiciary is in fact allowing the Executive to determine the outcome
of that aspect of the case at bar. An argument could even be made
that such action is a violation of due process. It may prevent the issue
275
from a fair adjudication on the merits of the case.
In the event that the claim of privilege is linked to the abuse of
Executive power, there exists the dichotomy of an interested party
controlling the litigation-investigation by serving as the arbiter of what
evidence may be considered. Depending upon the ethics, impartiality,
and courage of the Executive, this may be, at best, naive and, in the
worst case, dangerous. Such a dependence is not dissimilar to Blanche
Dubois' forlorn appeal as the doctor takes her to the asylum, "I have
'276
always depended on the kindness of strangers.
Looking no further than the tapes in the United States v. Nixon
litigation shows how such dependence is an invitation to abuse. These
tapes clearly showed presidential involvement in, or at the least
awareness of, numerous illegal acts in his name. Not only did Nixon
claim, until their disclosure, substantive denial but he also portrayed
the discussions as relating directly to the duties of the office (as
required by the privilege). 277 The only relation most of these conversations had to presidential duties was remaining in office. 278
Currently the parameters for the application of Executive Privilege also pose a special set of problems with regards to congressional
274. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
275. Such concerns could in fact be partially addressed in cases where the defense
is being deprived of the materials by giving the prosecutor the choice of production
or dismissal. That is a mechanical solution that does not address the inherent
unfairness in the President making what in essence is a judicial determination. See
United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 621 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
276. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE, SC. 11.

277. See Watergate Discussion supra part II.A.
278. E.g., JAWORSKI, supra note 61.
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oversight. United States v. Nixon explicitly excluded the question of
Executive Privilege as applied to congressional oversight. 2 9 In the last
twenty years, as is true throughout our history, that area has been
the most active in the application of Executive Privilege. The most
difficult aspect of this privilege prong lies in the question of court
jurisdiction in the matter. There simply is not a good mechanism at
this point to resolve disputes. This lack of process has the benefit of
encouraging settlement of the dispute as happened in the EPA Burford
contempt of Congress proceedings. The encouragement is derived
from the desire to resolve the issue quickly rather than allowing it to
drag on for months or years. The down side to this is that Congress
often backs down. Out of deference it abdicates responsibility under
the checks and balances power allocation to provide oversight of
Executive power. As was perceptively described in the Steel Seizure
Case,2s0 there are certainly areas where the Constitution assigns specific
powers and duties to specific branches. It is far more common to
have the "zones of twilight" where it is unclear which branch controls
the power or even where both are coequal in power distribution. 281
Foreign affairs is an excellent example of the need for congressional oversight or agreement. The Executive has, since the earliest
periods of our history, exercised a privilege here. Unfortunately, as
with children and pets, the old adage of give them an inch and they
will take a mile, seems applicable. There is a profound difference
between releasing to Congress all the diplomatic communications
including those revealing the identity of foreign agents 2 2 and providing
Congress with the truth as to whether the Executive is in violation of
United States law by continuing to wage what constitutes a covert
war. 283 While Congress may be partially at fault for showing such
deference to the Executive, it is the Executive that has abused the
privilege.
B.

SOLUTIONS

The problems of deference, loopholes, equanimity, and abuse are
not insurmountable. The careful application and utilization of the
procedures described in the Nixon dicta would actually go a long way
to address these issues.
279. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974).
280. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
281. Id.
282. See supra part I.A.

283. As in the case of both the Vietnam War and Nicaragua Contra funding
hearings.
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In camera inspection schemes are probably the most practical
and rational method to address the majority of the problems found
with Executive Privilege.28 4 The judge is charged with the responsibility
for the determination of applicability and admissibility of evidence
throughout the litigation process. While some may argue it is naive
to assume confidentiality as well as impartiality, the judge is by nature
the neutral party. The Judiciary is required to be an impartial arbiter
in such matters and by tradition treats materials as confidential.
If the judge is going to be responsible for the determination they
must be afforded the opportunity to evaluate the evidence to determine
the applicability. To do otherwise limits the basis of the ruling to
descriptions of crucial material filtered through the sieve of self
interest. The only way that justice and truth may result from such
constraints is by the caprice of luck. It is for that reason, where the
party moving for production has shown a persuasive need, there must
be an in camera inspection prior to the judge's ruling.
This requirement for inspection may also help to remove some
of the overly deferential attitude found in the Judiciary. If upon
inspection, there is an indication that the only interest served by the
privilege is that of political protection, that sense of judicial deference
may quickly vanish. The fact that federal judges receive life appointments and are thus somewhat insulated from the vagaries of political
life should allow them to view the Executive Branch with a healthy
285
mix of respect and skepticism.
The Office of the President has become so dominant that while
the Judiciary must treat the office with respect and recognition of the
unique nature of the information generated, there is no need for
artificial means to support deference. If the Judiciary becomes too
deferential they will become a rubber stamp of the Executive Branch
and fail in the role of providing a balance to the Executive power.
Currently under the Nixon doctrine, there is a rebuttable presumption as to the applicability of the privilege. 2 6 Evidence is presumed to be privileged where the claim is made. This tends to reinforce
the deference. The Judiciary has repeatedly shown that there is no
need for artificial or procedural reinforcement of its natural deference.
Therefore the presumption should be that the privilege is not applicable unless the asserting party can show it to be. This combined with
284. Cf. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
285. This is not to say the Judiciary is insensitive to political dynamics. It is
only that they do not need to worry about the next election, patronage, or being
fired.

286. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
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the in camera inspection should help to counter the tremendous power

and potential for abuse that the Executive Branch holds with the

privilege.
There is also the pragmatic fact that there may well be other
methods available to the government to protect certain types of

information. One such method is a general recognition of the privileged nature of actual state secrets and other classified. materials. 287

While the classification mechanism remains suspect,2 88 there are con-

versations, facts, and situations that actually do merit privilege and
secrecy. Classification schemes can go a long way toward handling
those concerns.
Another privilege that may also be applicable is that of attorney-

client. The fact that in Watergate, particularly some of the presidential
conversations included the White House counsel, would seem to have
allowed the consideration of those conversations being privileged
under the attorney-client doctrine. 28 9 The fact that the conversations
were to facilitate the delivery of legal services would appear to raise

this specter. 290 What may well have taken them out of the privilege

was that the conversations were to further acts of illegality. 291 The
fact pattern does however imply the availability of the attorney-client
privilege.

In the area of congressional Executive Privilege disputes there
must be a mechanism to allow for a proper resolution and more
consistence in applicability and allowance. In 1990, the Administrative
Conference of the United States 292 recommended parameters and
287. The difference between this and Executive Privilege centers upon the secrecy
of the facts verses the privilege of the conversation or documents memorializing those
deliberations concerning the facts.
288. An example of this was in the Iran-Contra litigation when the government
contended that material that actually had been publicly disclosed and printed in the
press was still classified. See TOOBIN, supra note 156, at 236. There has been much
discussion on the topic of accountability in classification schemes. Such a topic
exceeds the scope of this article. An interested reader may look to the following for
background materials: KOH, supra note 255; Bruce E. Fein, The Constitution and
Covert Action, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 53 (1988); Noble, supra note 221.
289. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 246, at 771-809. See also Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States
v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
290. See proposed but rejected FED. R. EVID. 503 on attorney client privilege.
JAMES W.

MOORE, MOORE'S

FEDERAL PRACTICE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

1992

2 564-69 (1991). The original rules also contained a FED. R. EVID. 509. This
was entitled Secrets of State and Other Official Information. Id. at 584-89.
291. See proposed FED. R. EvnD. 503d(l). Id. at 565.
292. The governmental agency charged with streamlining and facilitating the
smooth flow of governmental business.
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criteria for such a scheme. 293 While the document states that the
creation of the procedure need not require actual legislation, it does
call for some documented procedure. From available information it
would appear that neither the Congress nor the President have addressed the recommendation.
The foundation of the recommendation is that of mutual accommodation. It calls for the Executive to state why the material is
privileged, respect and recognize basic congressional functions, and
maintain a compliance flexibility.2 94 The proposal suggests that Congress should recognize the legitimate Executive interests such as:
litigation, security, personal privacy, and commercial confidentiality. 295 The recommendation calls upon both branches to avoid overly
general demands. 296 The greater the specificity and selectivity the more
likely that both parties' interests will be accommodated. There must
also be flexibility. 297 There are times when an accommodation made
by allowing the information to deviate from the requested form, may
allow Congress to satisfy their need for information, but still allow
the President or agency to keep their privilege. An example would be
synopsis or summaries of requested documents.
For those disputes that cannot be resolved through the above
type of negotiation, the Conference suggests a number of alternatives.
These include the utilization of declaratory judgment procedures, use
of in camera panels comprised of retired judges, members of Congress
or Executive Branch officials, and finally the possibility of designating
an issue for study by the General Accounting Office. 298
CONCLUSION

It would appear that the only branch with the power to control
rampant use of Executive Privilege is that of the Judiciary. As was
shown in the previous section, the problem that must be overcome is
the natural deference that is paid to the judgment of the Executive.
As has been pointed out, the simple solutions are the increased use
of in camera inspection, shifting of the presumption and finally a
formalization of the procedures.
293. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Sensitive Information 1
CFR § 305.90-7 (1993).
294. Id.
295. Id.

296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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In the context of civil or criminal litigation these solutions seem
to offer much hope. Where there is a strong judge, the balancing test
promulgated in United States v. Nixon has been proven effective. It
may however only be useful where inspection of the evidence is
allowed. It is where there are cries of national security that the -biggest
problem exists in the litigation arena. There must be a fine line found
that may allow the interests of the people, the government, and the
accused to remain in synchronisity so that the synergism known as
justice may occur.
The area of congressional oversight and Executive Privilege seems
to be one ripe for resolution. There may well be some efforts at work
to formalize a resolution mechanism when Executive Privilege claims
are disputed with Congress.
In the twenty years since United States v. Nixon it is clear that
Executive Privilege is still controversial, still presenting the courts
with difficult questions, and still in need of discipline.
K. A. McNEELY-JOHNSON

